The primacy of “influence operations” of hybrid warfare where it is hard to discern a beginning or indeed an end to hostilities or a form of permanent war in which it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between normal legal activities, coercive diplomacy and war makes the theory of hybrid warfare ‘anticipatory’ strategy; where, Non-State hybrid warfare (battlefield in places like Chechnya and Lebanon, and was later applied to Afghanistan and Iraq) and State hybrid warfare (Russian actions in Ukraine) becomes a conceptual unify model to statecraft and understanding military approach to Post-Cold Warera international security. The ‘anticipatory’ strategy nature of hybrid warfare in the last twenty years of Post-Cold war era offer greater conceptual clarity as scenarios for case studies. It is meant as a common starting point for further discussion on the future security environment and how to deter, mitigate and counter hybrid war threats, from states or non-state actors. We must think broadly about security and defence challenges. Many of these lie outside of the traditional military domain, and we lack readily available ideas on how to respond to them. The three hybrid warfare scholars Hoffman, Glenn and McCuen identify together eight different modes of warfare: Conventional capabilities, Irregular tactics, Terrorism, Criminal activities, Political means, Economic means, Information means and Social means [1-10]. These modes of warfare encapsulate in Table 1. Adaptive theatre of war construct at war and peace time for war ecosystem. The physical battleground, therefore, includes the physical modes of warfare, whilst the conceptual dimension includes the non-military means of warfare and where is fought for the control and support of the societies [3].

Table 1: Adaptive theatre of war construct at war and peace time for war ecosystem.

A case study methodology was chosen, because hybrid warfare is a complex and contested concept with lots of theoretical, but little empirical evidence. Moreover, a comparative case study approach will allow for an in-depth analysis and provide thorough insights. This approach provides high internal validity, at the cost of the external validity and reliability [11]. These deficiencies are countered through triangulation via diverse data sources. Additionally, the triangulation of data sources allows for a “thick description of the phenomenon under scrutiny” [12]. The cases that are selected for the comparative analyses: Russia’s actions in Crimea (November 2013 - March 2014) and Daesh militant occupied territory in western Iraq and eastern Syria.

This time period is chosen due to the enormous amount of information that is available, and June 2014 marks the date that Daesh self-proclaimed the caliphate Islamic State. Daesh is a militant movement that has occupied territory in western Iraq and eastern Syria. The organization originates from the al-Qaeda Iraq faction, nonetheless, it has split from the faction. In June 2014, after conquering territories in Iraq, as the cities Mosul and Tikrit; Daesh proclaimed itself as the Islamic State as the caliphate, claiming political and theological authority of Muslims all over the world [13]. However, its state-building has been justified by Shari’a law, and its battlefield victories have attracted thousands of foreign fighters [14].

Various characteristics have been attributed to hybrid warfare conducted by non-state actors. First, these actors exhibit increased levels of military sophistication as they move up the capabilities ladder, successfully deploying modern weapons systems (like anti-ship missiles), technologies (cyber, secure communication, sophisticated command and control), and tactics (combined arms) traditionally understood as being beyond the reach of non-state adversaries. Combining these newly acquired conventional techniques and capabilities with an unconventional skill set and doing so simultaneously and within the same battle space is seen as a potentially new and defining characteristic of non-state [15]. This emphasis on greater military sophistication and capabilities is one of the key features of non-state actors using hybrid warfare. Examples like the growing sophistication and complexity of non-state actors on the battlefield in places like Chechnya, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq.

State hybrid warfare like Russian actions in Ukraine most notably the “blurring” of traditional concepts of warfare, its unfamiliarity, the use of non-military means, and the asymmetric relationship to Western conventional war fighting have all contributed to labelling these Russian actions¹. The concept hybrid warfare is currently used to explain certain threats and warfare acts. For example, both NATO and the European Union reCenter of Gravitynize Russia’s aggression in Crimea and the advances of Daesh in Iraq and Syria as hybrid warfare threats [16,17]. The cases that are selected for the comparative analysis are: Russia’s actions in Crimea (November 2013 – March 2014) and the actions of Daesh² in Iraq and Syria (June 2014 – December 2014). These cases are selected, because multiple authors have labelled these as cases of hybrid warfare. Nevertheless, it is not specified what exactly is identified as hybrid warfare in the actions of Russia and Daesh, which makes it interesting to contrast these cases using similar modes of warfare and dimensions of hybrid warfare. The analytics for solutions can only be accommodated by framework.

National interest/value

The formulation of national strategy, as it does at any level of strategy, employs the strategic thought process based on the use of Ends, Ways, and Means:

A. National Objectives - ENDS

B. National Strategic Concepts - WAYS

C. National Resources - MEANS [18].

Thus, war is the enforcement of interests⁴. On the other hand, however, not every type of interest enforcement must be war. The importance of state cyber-power has been illustrated by Edward Snowden’s revelations regarding National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance practices. Snowden was also aware that “[... he had increased the power of the state through his work...]”⁵.The ‘small wars,’ hybrid wars tend to be long wars. The insurgency in Guatemala lasted for over thirty years. The current war in Columbia began in the 1960s. All the African insurgencies lasted for more than a decade. Israel fought Hizballah in southern Lebanon for eighteen years [19]. In Syria, Russia will find it more and more difficult to keep its powerful position, as it is being constantly challenged by an assortment of regional actors. On the domestic front, Putin’s Russia is experiencing internal change. The most noticeable development is an on-going shift in the centre of gravity in the Russian opposition to Putin away from liberals and democrats and towards communists and nationalists.

Challenge

The rules of engagement both civilian and military developed for land, sea and air, over the centuries and millennia, require unprecedented adaptation today. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 President Bush declared an all- out war on global terrorism and emphasised that it was ‘a new war, a war that will require a new way of thinking’⁶. The understanding of the modus operandi of the non-state actor and state actor hybrid warfare is the challenge to in practical terms, the Western security community has, under the lead of the United States, outgrown and departed from the notions of large-scale state- based military threats, great-power politics and associated political manoeuvring, and the defence of territory (national territory and alliance territory) as the real and primary mission of the armed forces. The 2005 National Defence Strategy was noteworthy for its expanded under- standing of modern threats. The strategy even noted that the Department of Defence was “over invested” in the traditional mode of warfare and needed to shift resources and attention to other challengers⁷. Hybrid warfare is seen as a concept that is a Western attempt to categorise what was witnessed in Ukraine. The often cited Russian “Gerasimov doctrine” describes modern warfare as joint operations utilising a mix of military and nonmilitary means to achieve political goals and taking full advantage of the intentionally blurred line between war and peace⁸. Globalization makes hybrid threats in large-scale warfare systems that requires networked teams to perform in a reliable manner under changing mission tactics and ad-hoc reconfiguration of mission tasks and force resources. If we are willing to accept that the fighting is going on perpetually and that the frontlines may cover the whole of society, the defender must be able to put forward a comprehensive defence framework solution. This should allow an agile and distributed response to multi-pronged hybrid threats. Through this kind of comprehensive security approach, the defender can build a more resilient society able to face the threats, in most cases ‘anticipatory’.

Objective

To understand the ‘anticipatory’ model of hybrid warfare either state and non-state actors by a case studies methodology (Russia’s actions in Crimea and Daesh’s actions in Iraq and Syria) was chosen, because hybrid warfare is a complex and contested concept with lots of theoretical, but little empirical evidence and analytical framework. Moreover, a comparative case study approach will allow for an in-depth analysis and provide thorough insights in the era of globalization and antecedents of participants as inputs to development of the framework. Modern warfare is powered by “information supremacy,” like “the War Between the Wars” Hezbollah / Israel war. The utilization of the framework allows the stakeholder groups to have a shared understanding of what will constitute future military capability. Additionally, the different service branches of the military can both explore and determine their degree of commonality and inter-service capabilities. Building a more resilient society should not be viewed only as an extra burden for already economically struggling Western societies; it is also a great opportunity to change the status quo. The structures that allow a society to respond in an agile manner to hybrid threats also support better understanding and coping with the complex underlying interrelations that make our modern societies fragile because of globalization and the internet. The proposed hybrid warfare framework the will encapsulates all the key stakeholders in various parts of the society and military statecraft to share a common situational awareness, threat and risk assessment, and planning and continuous processes of operational art of warfare called war ecosystem as shown in Table 1.

Justification

Russia’s actions in the annexation of Crimea and Daesh’s actions in Iraq and Syria help accentuate a need for the ‘framework for hybrid warfare’: “How can ‘hybrid warfare’ be identified and solutions crafted? The primacy of “influence operations” accentuated by globalization and internet technologies in Post-Cold war era has allowed for framework thinking to military doctrine on warfare strategy today. The modes of warfare identified in the actions of Russia in Crimea and conflict of Daesh in Iraq and Syria are: conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, terrorism, criminal activities, political, economic, information, and social as affirmed by Hoffman, Glenn, McCuen: multi-modality, simultaneity, fusion, and catastrophic [2,3,20]. This can offer greater conceptual clarity about hybrid war but should not be read as a blueprint for action. It is meant as a common starting point for further discussion on the future security environment and how to deter, mitigate and counter hybrid war threats, from states or non-state actors. Hybrid warfare represent the latest manifestation of the Western need to (re) conceptualise and (re)define the Post-Cold War international security logic and associated rules according to which states use military force -and other elements of statecraft in the international system. The hybrid war tactics that Russia uses today, however, are not identical to those used during the Cold War. Even if Russia used information operations back then, the volume and ambition of Russian information campaigns today are far greater and facilitated by the existence of the Internet, cable news, and especially social media encapsulated in globalization campaign of capitalism. The use of cyber operations is also new, as is Russia’s more extensive use of economic levers to influence foreign governments in third world countries. Because Russia and the world are much more closely interlinked than during the Cold War, it is easier for Russia to penetrate Western societies. Russia’s use of these tactics also appears to be less ideological than during the Cold War, when the Kremlin held a hidebound Marxist ideology. Hybrid warfare is seen as a concept that is a Western attempt to categorise what was witnessed in Ukraine. The often cited Russian “Gerasimov doctrine” describes modern warfare as joint operations utilising a mix of military and nonmilitary means to achieve political goals and taking full advantage of the intentionally blurred line between war and peace. Russian military experts have watched as the United States and its allies fought in the Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere over the course of the last quarter- century. They seized upon the importance of an approach that seeks to influence the population of target countries through information operations, proxy groups, and other influence operations.

Russia uses hybrid warfare to work within existing political and social frameworks to further Russian objectives.

British Defence Doctrine Joint Warfare Publication (JWP): Doctrine is not a set of rules, which can be applied without thought; it is, rather, a framework for understanding the nature of armed conflict and the use of force... Its purpose is to guide, explain and educate, and to provide the basis for further study and informed debate.”⁹

A Soviet View: A nation’s officially accepted system of scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of the armed forces in them, and on the requirements arising from these views regarding the country and its armed forces being made ready for war”¹⁰. “Future Conflict will be increasingly hybrid in character. This is not a code for insurgency or stabilisation, it is about a change in the mind set of our adversaries, who are aiming to exploit our weaknesses using a wide variety of high-end and low-end asymmetric techniques. These forms of conflict are transcending our conventional understanding of what equates to irregular and regular activity; the “conflict paradigm” has shifted and we must adapt our approaches if we are to succeed”¹¹.

What this tour of definitions reveals is that no single definition of military doctrine considered so far captures its many constituent parts. The art of writing good military doctrine, Codner suggests, “is essentially a simplifying process”¹². Setting out a view of the character of conflict is something fundamental to the construction of any military doctrine. This is usually done in capstone or highest-level doctrine or as a separate study to provide the necessary understanding of the character of conflict in order to determine its impact on the doctrinal principles shaping the employment of armed forces [21]. Finding the correct balance is the source of inherent tension in modern warfare doctrine.

Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyber warfare. Hybrid warfare can be used to describe the flexible and complex dynamics of the battle space requiring a highly adaptable and resilient response. There are a variety of terms used to refer to the hybrid war concept: hybrid war, hybrid warfare, hybrid threat, or hybrid adversary (as well as non-linear war, non-traditional war or special war). US military bodies tend to speak in terms of a hybrid threat, while academic literature speaks of hybrid warfare. For the purposes of this paper, these terms are used interchangeably. Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions [22]. There is no universally accepted definition of hybrid warfare which leads to some debate whether the term is useful at all. Some argue that the term is too abstract and only the latest term to refer to irregular methods to counter a conventionally superior force. The abstractness of the term means that it is often used as a catch all term for all non-linear threats [23,24]. Hybrid warfare is warfare with the following aspects which is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Hybrid threats.¹³

A non-standard, complex, and fluid adversary [23,24].

• A hybrid adversary uses a combination of conventional and irregular methods [25]

• A hybrid adversary is flexible and adapts quickly [26]

• A hybrid adversary uses advanced weapons systems and other disruptive technologies [27,28]

• Use of mass communication for propaganda [29,30]

• A hybrid war takes place on three distinct battlefields [31]

Framework

A framework can be defined as a reusable design of an application together with an implementation[32-35]. In February 2013, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff Army-General Valeriy Gerasimov, authored an article in Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, “ The Value of Science is in Foresight”¹⁴. It dealt with Russian military perspectives on the future of warfare and the nature of its implications for military science. Gerasimov intended the article to serve as a rallying call to the military scientific community in Russia to refocus on the challenges of future conflicts at a practical and meaningful level¹⁵. Modern warfare requires, “resilience thinking” to addresses the dynamics and development of complex scenarios by constrains and influences of geography and externalities. This is known as the adaptive cycle, as it describes how an ecosystem organizes itself and how it responds to a changing world as shown in Figure 3. Hamel’s metaphor for 21st century management is the Internet: ‘I’m willing to bet that Management 2.0 is going to look a lot like the Web 2.0 [36]. The framework for examining military capability as the output dimension of national power is patterned analogously to the larger framework for assessing national power. It seeks to identify the strategic resources a military receives from the government it serves; the variables bearing upon the means by which these resources are converted into effective capabilities the combat force itself understood via a spectrum of war fighting competencies that may be attained to a greater or lesser degree and which may be compared across countries as shown in Table 1 and Figure 4.

Figure 3: A: Internet of Things (IoTs)²² B: schematic showing the end users and application areas based on data for global collaboration with aspects of hybrid attack and defence systems²³.

Figure 4: Internet of things schematic showing the end users and application areas based on data for global collaboration with aspects of hybrid attack and defence systems as shown in Figure 5.

The possibility of denying cyber-attacks after the fact has already become a strategic element in a new type of computer-based conflict even between states. The armed conflict between Georgia and Russia prevailing since 2008 shows evidence of similar hybrid power projection whilst also making use of cyberspace. Attacks planned well in advance, with synchronized procedures including a similar approach as used in the case of the Stuxnet¹⁶ malware, being conceivable. In what is effectively a permanent state of war, Putin holds together a Russian national consensus through tightly scripted, state-controlled media that sustain a drumbeat against a morally bankrupt and powerobsessed West.

The instruments of this asymmetrical battle often involve major regime-linked corporations, cyber weapons, and propaganda. On December¹⁷, 2015, Putin named the United States a national security threat, the first time Russia has so designated Washington since the Soviet collapse about a quarter-century ago [37]. The U.S. has done the same the Department of Defence’s updated Cyber Strategy names Russia as the top threat to American interests and security. Russia's conduct is in fact novel in the modern age, deploying comparatively few conventional forces explicitly aimed at attacking the West, but focusing instead on the agile coordination of other instruments of national power. In practice, Russian hybrid attacks have employed diplomacy; cyberspace and information warfare; the threat of and actual use of military force, including scorched - Earth tactics against civilians; economic inducement and coercion; and legal tactics such as utilizing court systems [38]. Contrary to total war, hybrid threats are not aimed at the complete elimination of the adversary and the destruction of vital structures. Instead, hybrid threats are to be classified as overextension strategies on various levels in multiple spheres that collectively lead to a multiple institutional breakdown.

Modern warfare framework

Russia’s special forces - the Spetsnaz have played a significant role in Russia’s operations in Crimea and Ukraine Capitalization of non-military means on the one hand allows a country like Russia to manipulate the globalized world from inside¹⁸ and on the other hand it exposes the inability of the Western security institutions to counter those threats the way its predecessors did during the Cold War.

The world is becoming turbulent faster than organizations are becoming resilient [39]. Ideas must be adaptive to local challenges epitomized by adaptive theory thinking addresses the dynamics and development of complex social-ecological systems [40]. Modern warfare should be a framework or construct that encapsulate decision support and enabling technologies to achieve value streams or course of action (CoA). The growing complexity of our infrastructure, which has now permeated throughout our society’s systems, is becoming ever more vulnerable because of its increasing reliance on technology. Worthy of emphasis is the enormous increase in dependency on technical products which, in turn, creates new potential forms of state power (as well as for non-state actors). Challenges result in cyberspace, because there is scarcely any guarantee of identifying the aggressor. Arguments for internet exceptionalism applied to incitement stem from these features but also rely on other claims. Humans must adapt to collaborate with machines, and when that collaboration happens, the result is stronger as shown in Figures 4 and 7 respectively.

Hybrid war relatively low expense, an aggressive player intentionally blurs and exploits distinctions of war and peace, civilian and military operations, and state and non-state actors¹⁹. The framework for preventing hybrid wars and deterring/defeating hybrid adversaries is based on two pillars indicates that modern warfare must understand the cultural and political factors that drive non-state and state actors to resort to violence. This is what Goertz’s structure begins with a basic level concept that ontologically describes the phenomenon of interest of warfare strategy? [41]. For Clausewitz, in order for a theory of war to be universal, it had to satisfy two criteria: first, it had to accommodate the essential nature of war that, in its extreme, drove to absolute war; and, second, it had to demonstrate war in actual practice, as reflected the often times limited aims and means reflected in history. As Clausewitz noted, his was necessary in order to avoid a theory that was only applicable to a time period analysed, reflecting only the unique practices of a historical age, that is, intelligence driven war. Jomini’s theory contributions weren’t necessarily in the realm of what we today call strategy. As Delbrück would later note, “Jomini sought the nature of strategy in the lines of operation and tested the advantages of the inner and outer lines of operation” encapsulate the theory of ecosystem that helps manage uncurtaining [42]. In the anticipation war doctrine called war ecosystem Table 1.

In this context, the actors/participants of warfare ecosystem would include the material resources, means and ends concept on war strategy which includes funds, equipment, facilities, etc.) and the Human capital (H) (students, faculty, staff, industry researchers, industry representatives, etc.) that make up the institutional entities participating in the ecosystem (e.g. the universities, colleges of engineering, business schools, business firms, venture capitalists, industry-university research institutes, federal or industrial supported centres of excellence, and state and/or local economic development and business assistance organizations, funding agencies, policy makers, etc.), where each component works interdependently for adaptive solution based on scenarios and value creation called warfare ecosystems (Table 1). Figure 4 simplified the nature of modern warfare as integrated strategy with adaptive features for the war planners [43-45].

• End: (An intended result of an action; an aim, purpose) - Objectives

• Means: (Being the “instruments” by which some end can be achieved) - Resources

• Way: (A course of action). Concept - that, Centre of gravity

• Anticipation war doctrine: Adaptive theatre of war construct at war and peace time for war ecosystem and armed forces with the trajectories of foresight (see Table 1 below).

• Forward/Back- loop: The primacy of “influence operations” of hybrid warfare.

The forward-loop (Preparation of war) characterized by uncertainty, novelty, and experimentation, and during intelligence possibilities of battlefield (IPB) of all forms and in Figure 4. The back-loop (determinant of warfare) is the time of greatest potential for intelligence collection and analysis in order to understand the actors (national interest and objects of threats) involved in theatre of war and the forces driving in the centre of gravity (CENTER OF GRAVITY) or creative change in the thresholds system like internet of things (machine-to-human interface) impacts on the agility of the battlefield. The scenario narrative gives voice to the important qualitative factors shaping development such as values in the three levels of war, behaviours and institutions, providing a broader perspective than is possible from mathematical modelling alone. Back-loop narrative offers texture, richness and insight, while the CENTER OF GRAVITY offers structure, discipline and rigor. Scenarios (A) can catalyse and guide appropriate action today for a coalition force interoperability and for execution and global collaboration. The Stakeholder (S) analysis will illuminate the vulnerably of enemy and allies. The Infrastructure (I) critical and vulnerable powered by network infrastructure. Risk can be managed by limiting autonomous functions, ensuring that the human operator is engaged, and by asking where human operators can safely be removed from control.

Military operational interactions and total environment

It refers to the capacity of human capital war ecosystems communities to evolve towards higher order complexity and harmony, through such innovation mechanisms as differentiation and integration, competition and collaboration at the centre of gravity. The collective activity of individuals and their modifications to the environment are responsible for intelligence. The commander can identify the character of operational art and optimize where necessary. In hybrid threat, hard power is often insufficient. Often the conflict evolves under the radar and even a "rapid" response turns out to be too late. Overwhelming force is an insufficient deterrent. Many traditional militaries lack the flexibility to shift tactics, priorities, and objectives on a constant basis [31,46].

Internet of Things (IoTs)

Connected devices made possible by the IoTs are here to stay and the trend will only grow with Enables Informed Manufacturing (EIM) which are shown in Figure 3.

An informed manufacturing organization contains four elements:

• informed products

• processes

• people

• infrastructure

Now an active component of CENTER OF GRAVITY doctrine for course of action. These essential elements of manufacturing are converging like never, creating a more automated, intelligent and streamlined manufacturing process. Knowledge is more quantitatively and qualitatively important than ever before (era of Big Data), and applications of information and communication technologies are the drivers of the new economy Godin and a coefficient of innovative opportunities [47,48]. The potential unintended consequences of overstating Russian strategic prowess and ‘hybrid warfare’ capabilities powered by Putin’s hands. After all, it is clear that Russian military aggression in Ukraine was motivated not least by the longstanding demand for respect on the international stage, as explicitly confirmed by Putin in his “Crimea speech ‘outlining what was, in his view, a long history of Western meddling in Russia’s affairs domestically and in its near abroad, he concluded that the events in Crimea set a sign that it was time ‘to accept the obvious fact: Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs. Like other countries, it has its own national interests that need to be considered and respected”²⁰. Gerasimov’s doctrine 20 rooted in the military historical framework of the Great Patriotic War and the need to avoid repeating the shock of invasion in June 1941. Gerasimov’s theme reflects a long-standing interest within Russian military theory in seeking to utilize military science to gain foresight (predvidenie) in terms of future conflict²¹. (see Table 1 and Figure 4).

Clearly, the fact that Russian foreign policy has often been based on prestige and status rather than on material/economic considerations has been hard to understand for the West. This is because of the assumption that economics and trade relations matter most in international policy, coupled with an expectation that countries do not act against their own economic interests. This might in fact be one of the biggest Western misperceptions about Russian behaviour and might therefore represent an important root cause of current tensions: Russian behaviour is not all about the economy and economic interests.

Application of framework

“In today’s dangerous world, there is no credibility without capability” [49]. As ideas and technologies forge change throughout history, the ways humans wage war changes accordingly. This perpetual change has recently accelerated with a major geopolitical shift in which the fall of the Soviet Union ended a bipolar world; many ethnic and national groups quickly sensed a new opportunity for freedom or reCenter of Gravitynition. We should not be surprised by these actors’ innovative methods and techniques of warfare as they release pent-up energy and pursue long-held ideological and nationalistic objectives. In the context of the information technology revolution of rapid globalization, of ethnic and nationalist struggles and reactionary religious movements - all layered against the back-drop of the end of the Cold War and the subsequent break- up of a familiar geopolitical and balance-of-power dynamic - a concept like Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) would inevitably emerge (relies on employing ‘’small, highly manoeuvrable, agile forces’’) Figures 4 and 7. Hammes, stated, that can blend into their environment and avoid being targeted [50]. The economic impact of terrorism as percentage of Nigeria Gross Domestic Product, (GDP) is 4.5% by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), 2016 and with 9.314 score third globally, the effects of Boko Haram groups and others. GTI ranks Nigeria 3rd most terrorised country globally (2017).

In general, 4GW blurs the lines between war and politics, conflict and peace, soldier and civilian, and battlefield violence and safe zones. This new form of warfare has arisen from the loss of the nation-state’s monopoly on violence; from the rise of cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict; and from the spread of globalization, particularly advanced technology [50]. It is conducted in an increasingly decentralized manner, dispersed throughout a region or even the world. It has no defined battlefield; instead 4GW is conducted simultaneously in population centres, rural areas, and virtual networks. It moves constantly to avoid detection and to target its enemy’s vulnerabilities. Modern warfare is powered by “information supremacy,” unprecedented quantities of accurate, speedy intelligence have become available as a result, making the hybrid wars possible from globalization and technology today as shown in Figures 3,4,7 and Table 1).

Fourth Generation Warfare’s targets are not just soldiers, but also non-combatants, religious ideas, legal frameworks, media outlets, international agencies and agreements, economic activities, political power, and the minds of the people. Accordingly, targets are selected not just for physical destruction, but more for their mental and moral impact on an adversary. In the end, 4GW’s goal is to exploit an adversary’s weaknesses and undermine its strengths in order “to convince the enemy’s political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit [50]”. Competition for resources - water, energy, commodities and food is also fuelling the potential for conflict. The existential character of the competition for these basic resources will make the choice of violence increasingly frequent and will increase the likelihood of regional instability. Also, climate change and natural disasters are destabilizing phenomena known as scenario (S) in Figures 4 and 7 respectively. They both exacerbate infrastructure vulnerabilities in many developing countries and increase the likelihood of humanitarian crises, the potential for epidemic diseases, and the prospect of regionally destabilizing population migrations [51]. Lastly, proliferation of or increased access to all forms of weapons of mass destruction increases the potential for catastrophic attacks.

Even the prospect of these attacks can be destabilizing because such attacks dramatically increase the number of potential victims and the scope of damage. These separatist or nationalist groups and religious radicals gain their strength from the urbanized and deprived regions of the world. These unconventional actors with a substantial following from the masses, some of whom belong to global networked terrorist groups, operate beyond state control and regularly disregard international boundaries, norms, and agreements. Many work alongside criminal groups to fund operations and destabilize targeted regions even further (like Boko Haram in Nigeria).These groups have become masters of the “battle of narratives” (their perceived values) - a struggle beyond the physical elements of a conflict in which the manipulation of the media, the use of the internet, and the integration of information operations with a strategic communication program are as important as weapons systems or even success on the battlefield.

Gerasimov’s doctrine rooted in the military historical framework of the Great Patriotic War and the need to avoid repeating the shock of invasion in June 1941. Gerasimov’s theme reflects a long-standing interest within Russian military theory in seeking to utilize military science to gain foresight (providence) in terms of future conflict²⁴.

Gerasimov reCenter of Gravitynized Russia must avoid the economically dangerous exercise of trying to play “catch up” with other powers but commended an approach to produce adequate countermeasures to expose potential enemy vulnerabilities (Figures 3, 5 and 6). Moreover, he appealed to the uniqueness of every conflict, which requires an understanding of the special logic involved in individual wars, drawing on the celebrated Soviet military scientist Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938) who famously noted war is “difficult to predict”²⁵. The idea that ‘hybrid warfare’ is a successful innovation of Russian military thinking also imbues the Russian political and military leadership with an undue degree of strategic prowess and, in this sense, might represent a repetition of old mistakes. Interpreting Crimea as evidence of a grander master plan of Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ is reminiscent of organisation and coordination (Figures 1, 3 and 7).

Figure 5: Centre of gravity (CENTER OF GRAVITY) suggested graphic description of the elements and their connection adapted from Jonas Andersons (2009)³⁸.

Figure 6: Centre of gravity analyses. “Conduct two side- by-side” for Critical Vulnerabilities (CV)³⁹.

Figure 7: Military operational art shift to automation in 21st century war ecosystem narrative of Table 1⁴³.

As it turned out, the Soviet Union leadership’s centralisation and strategic foresight was not as strong as had been presumed. Fettweis stated, seeking patterns in the creation of enemy images throughout history, “people are aware of their own internal deliberations and divisions but see only the outcomes of decisions made elsewhere, which makes other actors seem unified and strategic [52]”. Russia aggressively manipulates news and other public data with a military doctrine under which the operating environment is continuously shaped, in times of war and peace. The Russian military conducts operations both in the country’s own information sphere - its media and Internet spaceand outside its borders [53]. In addition to espionage, Russia has the capability to disrupt and deter Western activities, should open war break out. In October 2015, the United States detected Russian intelligence-gathering vessels and submarines operating near critical undersea data cables [54]. In many of the former Soviet Republics, large Russian minorities have expressed their desire to re-establish closer ties with Russia, as opposed to the various ethnic majorities who seek to establish relations with the west.

In addition, Russia has introduced a new version of its surveillance technology called SORM, which intercepts and stores phone calls and Internet traffic. SORM provides state security services, particularly the domestic Federal Security Service, with backdoor access [55]. Facebook and Twitter are subject to traffic filtering at the network level; they are also compelled to store the data of Russian users in Russia, to provide it on the request of Russian authorities, and to block content if the Kremlin so desires [56]. Countries in Africa, Asia and the Americas are still struggling to implement peaceful democratic rule after centuries of colonial rule. In the greater Middle East, underlying historical, religious and ideological differences that were masked by the rule of pan-Arab Nationalist dictators during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath are now rising to the surface and producing violent conflict. This struggle is often driven by a secular/fundamentalist divide - as seen in Libya and Egypt, or Shi’a/Sunni divide-as seen in Syria and Iraq. Cultural, religious and ideological struggles for power are not limited to the greater Middle East. In Africa, we are seeing the continued growth of Islamic fundamentalist non-state actors and insurgent groups - like Boko Haram in Nigeria, who are attempting to resolve their differences using violence.

The myth of Russian hybrid warfare capability became embedded in Western commentary and political discussion on how to strengthen defence capabilities vis-à-vis Russia²⁶. The challenges posed by the weaponization of non-military means in a modern-day conflict are distinctly of 21st century in nature. The multi-dimensional deployment of capabilities and resources for the purpose of conducting conflict forms the core element of hybrid threat. Alongside direct attacks on the adversary’s armed forces, the strategy of hybrid threat also targets the economic, infrastructural, social and other prerequisites of the target state and its allies. Theoretically, the assumption would be that not all effects would be foreseeable and that the pattern of reactions of the target state under attack would be difficult to predict. “Military power expresses and implements the power of the state in a variety of ways within and beyond the state borders and is also one of the instruments with which political power is originally created and made permanent.” For this reason, the ultimate “output” of national power should be -ideally- the ability of a military force to successfully prosecute a variety of operations against a country’s adversaries. The aggressor is confronted with counterintuitive consequences. Unintended effects on collateral persons or property (e.g. civilians, allies, domestic export business, etc.) are capable of injecting unforeseen impetus to the dynamics of conflict. Such sources of impetus – even if they are un- foreseen and surprising – can be used in turn with other spectra of hybrid threat for further attacks, assuming enough flexibility of the actor. As well as unintended consequences, a set of effects can arise, which were neither predictable nor estimable ex ante. Financial transaction systems, wholesalers and the associated stock of customer data possess a previously unimaginable power projection potential for weakening a state’s commercial position. War ecosystem examples concerns like Amazon or the Chinese counterpart Alibaba. The latter has now grown larger than Amazon and eBay combined and operates at a remarkable level of profit²⁷.

The internet has access to innumerable sub-networks²⁸, yet there is a dearth of diversity in system elements. Consequently malware, for example, can spread very quickly. In a world of limited resources, it is not sustainable and has a self-destructive effect. The essential question here is whether we could still successfully turn away without any creative destruction, in which old goods and production techniques are continuously replaced by new ones, as the motor of economic development. Creative and imaginative entrepreneurs play a central role in this (warfare ecosystem) in Table 1. In nature, disturbances are not overridden but rather they are integrated into the process. This requires vacant spaces, buffers, redundancies, variations, diversity, flexibility and capability of change and adjustment, attributes of the philosophy of anticipation war doctrine. Of importance are barriers, in order to ensure the limitation of effective range in the event of disturbances. Today the European electricity supply system possesses insufficient barriers capable of preventing the propagation of a disturbance.

Therefore, a major disruption could spread across the entire continent within a few seconds. Russian military thinkers agree that the biggest threats to Russia’s security come from aerospace. Aerospace has become the main sphere of military conflict, and weapons employed in aerospace are the primary weapons of 21st‐ century wars since they can achieve many kinds of missions (operational tactical, operational, operational strategic and strategic), without the employment of nuclear weapons [57]. Russian thinking about military operations in aerospace seems to follow the Soviet tradition of emphasizing offense over defence. Condoleeza Rice’s description of Soviet strategy and doctrine as one of a dichotomy is valid even today: “Soviet political doctrine is explicitly defensive, but Soviet military strategy is undeniably offensive, even preemptive in character.” Rice (1986) early 2000s, Russian periodicals have included articles dealing with “network‐centric” warfare Raskin and Pelyak and the need for the creation of unified information, command and control systems [58,59]. In modern warfare, Russia is pursuing network centric capabilities, including the transition from vertical to global networked automation systems [60].To prepare for war in space, the USSR also developed and tested anti‐satellite systems (including a co orbital one) and deployed the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)²⁹.

“In the Russian view of national security, military security is fundamental and the only aspect of security which is indispensable” [61]. Thus, prioritizing the reconstitution of Russia’s military over other economic considerations can be expected to be maintained into the future regardless of the state of relations with partners (war ecosystem Table 1) and competitors, and while relations with the West run through their familiar predictable cycle of thaw and freeze [61]. Russia and China submitted the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) to the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva³⁰. Given that the PPWT’s definition of a space weapon is inherently unverifiable and thus dooms the draft to failure, it is doubtful how genuine this attempt to prevent weaponization of space is. The PPWT defines a “weapon in outer space” as “any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, which has been specially produced or converted to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth, or inflict damage on them. In Syria, Russia will find it more and more difficult to keep its powerful position, as it is being constantly challenged by an assortment of regional actors.

Centre of gravity

“Invincibility lies in the defence; the possibility of victory in the attack.” - Sun Tzu. The centre of gravity (Center of Gravity) is a concept developed by Carl Von Clausewitz, a Prussian military theorist, in his work On War³¹. The definition of a Center of Gravity is "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act³²." Thus, the centre of gravity is usually seen as the "source of strength". The United States Army tends to look for a single centre of gravity, normally in the principal capability that stands in the way of the accomplishment of its own mission. In short, the army considers a "friendly" Center of Gravity as that element - a characteristic, capability, or locality - that enables one's own or allied forces to accomplish their objectives. Conversely, an opponent's Center of Gravity is that element that prevents friendly forces from accomplishing their objectives.

For example, according to US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, the centre of gravity in a counterinsurgency is the protection of the population that hosts it³³.The result of the Center of Gravity analysis provides input for what objectives and decisive points that should be accomplished and how to use the forces in order to reach the desired end-state³⁴ Warden Center of Gravity is useful in planning operations since it “describes the point where the enemy is most vulnerable and the point where an attack will have the best chance of being decisive” [62]. Leonhard claims that the Center of Gravity is the enemy’s vulnerabilities and not his strengths [63]. Echevarria asserts that Center of Gravity is not the strength, not the source of strength and not a weakness and the Center of Gravity is what holds the enemy’s force together [64]. Center of Gravity is the “focal point” that holds the system together, but only exists if there is a certain degree of connection as shown in Figure 4. The effective Swedish doctrines35 emphasizing that Center of Gravitys is connected to strength, either the source of strength or the strength itself.

• Critical Capabilities (CC): every centre of gravity has some primary ability (or abilities) that makes it a centre of gravity in the context of a given Infrastructures (I)situation or mission – including phases within campaigns or operations”³⁶

• Critical Requirements (CR): are conditions, resources and means that are essential for a center of Gravity to achieve its critical capability.

• Critical Vulnerabilities (CV): are those critical requirements, or components thereof, that are deficient,or vulnevulnerable to neutralization or defeat in a way that will contribute to a centre of gravity failing to achieve its critical capability³⁷”

Figure 5 illuminate Stakeholders (A) in Figure 4. However, when the Center of Gravity and its CC are identified the model becomes more comprehensible and clears again (Figure 6). When conducting planning the professional officer needs to “conduct two side- by-side” Center of Gravity and CV analyses. Strange/Iron claim that a Center of Gravity has both intrinsic and external weaknesses and that they can be of many types including technical, geographical or more abstract factors such as national psyche. Interestingly, a weakness in one context can be a strength in another, which means that the “window of opportunity” is many times based on time as an essential factor and adaptability.

The theories of Vego, Strange and Iron claim that Center of Gravity in its essence belongs to the strengths in the system [51,65]. Due to the iterative and brainstorming nature of the Strange/Iron method the process is hard to provide in detail. The process is initiated by an iterative brainstorming, summarized below, where Center of Gravitys and their CC are identified, which forms the foundation for CR and CV identification.

When continuing the analysis, each CC is tracked backwards to identify what is required to maintain that capability and to identify possible vulnerabilities connected these requirements In order to make the analysis easier to conduct and view, they propose that the model is used in a four column format. The format including the connection between Center of Gravity, CC, CR and CV in Figure 5. The example of CENTER OF GRAVITY vigor and sophistication of Russian hybrid operations. Russia has developed its hybrid capabilities over a twodecade period and incorporated its evolving doctrine and capabilities into its strategic thinking. Its years of on-the-ground experience include increasingly complex examples of maskirovka (subterfuge) -the elements of surprise, iversion, and deception⁴⁰“The War Between the Wars ” Israel’s low-profile campaign to disrupt Hezbollah’s bases in Lebanon achieved success based on “information supremacy⁴¹”

Moscow appears to understand that it must continue to improve if it wants to compete and win. The Russian hacker group Cyber Berkut⁴² attacked routers, software, and hard drives at Ukraine’s National Election Commission with the objective of hobbling the release of the official vote count and producing false results [66,67].

Amid a show of hybrid tactics, Putin has awarded financial support to fringe political movements in Western Europe, launched cyberattacks and espionage in Europe, and ordered probing and actual attacks on U.S. and European energy and communications infrastructure. He has continued to attempt to use control over energy- pipelines, nuclear plants, and natural gas supplies to wield influence across Europe. The main source of power of a Center of Gravity is situated in the inner core while elements providing integration, protection and sustainment are placed in the outer core. Importantly, the two cores need to be viewed and the inner core cannot function well if the outer core is deficient. While a cyber-espionage case harking back nearly 30 years may sound dated, it highlights Moscow’s long, keen interest in an advantage in cyberspace, and its grasp of its strategic importance [68].

Russia must promote a massive 'fog of war' and ambiguous 'centre of gravity' for its adversaries, while ensuring minimum 'friction factor' in its hybrid warfare campaigns. Such military thinking necessitates a highly centralized politico-military structure in Moscow, while requiring decentralized freedom of movement, permanent readiness, and combined arms war fighting capabilities at least at battalion level for elite formations and what I called war ecosystem [69].

IoT technologies offer promise for data gathering, as well as information generation and dissemination. IoT in Command and Control (C2). The Internet of Things (IoT) stands to provide new means for establishing C2 situational understanding. Integration of Artificial Intelligence (Target Identification / Classification / Prioritization - Conducting pattern reCenter of Gravitynition and extrapolation). Integration of Autonomous sensor platforms (Unmanned Vehicles, Ground Sensors, Autonomous Robotic Platforms).

The internet of things (IoTs) is not new to the military. In the 1990s, military leaders mapped out a vision for how networks and data would transform the way that war was fought. This concept formed the foundation of “network-centric warfare” [70,71]. IoT is an ecosystem of technologies that generates, shares, analyses, and creates value from data (Figures 3, 4 and 7). The deployment of IoT- related technologies by the military has primarily focused on applications for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and fire-control systems AS SHOWN IN Figure 7 [72]. The military has millions of sensors connected through an extensive network infrastructure, but few systems leverage the full IoTs stack, from connected sensors to digital analytics and automated responses. The military has also developed and deployed IoT- related technologies in segregated “stovepipes,” making it difficult to secure and limiting the ability to communicate across systems and generate economies of scale or synergies from different types of data. Gone are formal bureaucratic structures, and Multi-Team System (MTS) designs are becoming the norm [73,74]. Recent team-focused research has emphasized the point that teams need to well manage interfaces with their external environments if they are to be effective [75-77]. Although Marks framework was designed to apply to team-level processes; Mathieu et al. (2001) submitted that it also applies to MTS-level processes [78]. The key distinguishing issue, however, is that in a MTS, the component teams need to synchronize their joint actions so as to facilitate the accomplishment of higher order goals.

Anticipation war doctrine

These works epitomize “Anticipation war doctrine” accentuate Gerasimov’s doctrine of blurring divide between 'war and peace' in the 21st century threat landscape: "Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template." Civil-Military imbalance for global engagement, warned that U.S. aid to Africa is becoming increasingly “militarized,” favouring kinetic operations to restore order and protect populations over long-term development projects aimed at the root causes of terrorism, genocide, and displacement the percentage of development assistance controlled by the Pentagon went from 3.5 percent to nearly 22 percent during the past decade, while the U.S. Agency for International Development’s share of development assistance declined from 65 percent to 40 percent)44. The optimization of space, now contributes to military power with the concepts of network centric warfare, and reconnaissance and information strikes like drones. The growing complexity of our infrastructure, which has now permeated throughout our society’s systems, is becoming ever more vulnerable because of its increasing reliance on technology. IoT technologies have redefine Command and Control (C2) for modern warfare with the advancement of Multi-Team System (MTS) designs. Compulsory military service should be used to train young people in self- efficacy and the capacity for self-help and introduction of deep learning in education curriculum for modern war planners (Figure 3).

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that irregular warfare which is profoundly political, intensely local, and protractedbreaks from the traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should contribute to the overall effort. Success in the highly political requiring resiliency and “Anticipation War Doctrine” framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. The adaptive theory that better respond to complexity with converge IoTs technologies can be used as best practices for defining clear objectives, the use of scenarios, emphasis on pattern analysis, and ensuring greater scope for creative and decentralized critical infrastructure for decision making will help illustrate challenges of modern warfare and solutions. Anticipated war doctrine accentuate the distributed leadership capabilities of war ecosystem for course of action at the centre of gravity of modern battlefield (Table 1) will need to change proactively in war and peace time. On the domestic front, Putin’s Russia is experiencing internal change. The most noticeable development is an on-going shift in the centre of gravity in the Russian opposition to Putin away from liberals and democrats and towards communists and nationalists⁴⁵.

The principal aim of using the warfare framework is to develop a single visual representation of future military force structure Implications and future warfare validated by Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) with the resultant impact on space weaponization. Warfare will occur concurrently throughout all participants. A hybrid adversary can be state or non-state (the Israel–Hezbollah War and the Syrian Civil War, Russia’s ‘hybrid approach’ in Crimea).The utilization of the framework allows the stakeholder groups to have a shared understanding of what will constitute future military capability (Figure 7). Additionally, the different service branches of the military can both explore and determine their degree of commonality and interservice capabilities similar construct (United Kingdom, United States and Canada). The Internet has changed the global battle space and our understanding of New Global Insurgency. Hybrid war framework encapsulates decision support and enabling technologies to achieve value streams for coalition force interoperability. The hybrid warfare framework provides a basis for military competence based on trust and challenges of 4GW. Thus, military leaders face incentives to develop expertise and to offer their best advice while reCenter of Gravitynizing the limits of military expertise (Figures 4, 5 and 6 respectively).

Although civilian and military leaders both share responsibility, Policy permeates all military operations according to this framework establishes the source of war, dictates the available means, and determines the desired ends. What all Army operations will have in common is a need for innovative and adaptive leaders and cohesive teams that thrive in conditions of complexity and uncertainty like space weaponization ecosystem communities success of Space X promoted by United States including use of drones in modern warfare encapsulate distributed weapons coordination (DWC) concept development trade space perspective of future warfare. We are scarcely aware of the extent to which our moral imagination has been transformed since 1945 by technology and globalization. Defence establishments must stop attempting to develop military solutions to the challenges they prefer to solve instead of addressing the way their adversaries will most likely engage in conflict. The mapping of capabilities onto the framework then allows the stakeholders to develop their transformation roadmaps and synchronize the associated capability development plans for execution. Hybrid warfare framework encapsulates the concept of war everywhere and how to manage the challenges. President Donald Trump declared US Space Force as the 6th branch of the military by 2020 that will seeks to measure national power in military terms and undertake the “information-dominant” operations that are seen to revolutionize warfare, must gather and assess information pertaining to the variables and vulnerably of modern warfare⁴⁶.

¹John Vandiver, “SACEUR: Allies must prepare for Russia ‘hybrid war’”, Stars and Stripes, September 4, available at: http://www.stripes.com/ news/saceur-alliesmust- prepare-for-russia-hybrid-war-1.301464

²Daesh has many other names, such as ‘Islamic State’, ‘IS’ ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’, ‘ISIL’, ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’, and ‘ISIS’. However, Daesh is used because it is “neither Islamic nor a state” (Black, 2014)

³Alexander H. Montgomery Department of Political Science, Reed College ahm@ reed.edu Available at: https://www.scribd.com/document/266421120/1-2

⁴Liddell Hart, B. H. Strategy London: Faber, 1967 (2nd rev ed.) p. 321

⁵Edward Snowden Seibel, Alexandra: Die ganze Existenz aufs Spiel setzen [Betting your entire existence]. reporter at the Guardian, met Edward Snowden in Hong Kong in June 2013. In: Kurier, 29/12/2014, p. 21

⁶President George W Bush, BBC World TV News, 11 October , 2001

7Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 52, ( January 2009), 34–39

⁸Janis Berzinš, Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defence Policy (Centre for Security and Strategic Research, National Defence Academy of Latvia, April 2014); Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, July 6, 2014, https:// inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov- doctrine-andrussian- non-linear-war/.

⁹British Defence Doctrine Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, First Edition 1999, p. 1.2.

¹⁰Dictionary of Basic Military Terms: A Soviet View, (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, nd), p. 37

¹¹Future Character of Conflict, Strategic Trends Programme, DCDC, nd, p. 1.

¹²Marshal V.D.Sokolovsky (ed.), Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), pp.41-42

¹³Valeriy Gerasimov, “Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii,” Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 26, 2013, Available at: http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.

¹⁴“Moscow’s Visions of Future War: So Many Conflict Scenarios So Little Time, Money and Forces,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, no. 1 (January-March 2014): 63-100;

¹⁵Richterová , Jitka (2015). NATO Hybrid Threats Background Report. e-mail: summit@amo.cz © AMO

¹⁶Cyber-Physical System Security. SAP Research, Germany Available at : http:// papers.duck dns.org/files/2011_IECON_stuxnet.pdf,

¹⁷U.S. Department of Defence, "The Department of Defence Cyber Strategy," April 2015. Available at: (http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/ features/2015/0415 cyberstrategy/ Final 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy for web.pdf).

¹⁸Pomerantsev, The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes, Information, Culture and Money, The Interpreter, 2014.

¹⁹Frank Hoffman, “On Not -So -New Warfare: Political Warfare vs. Hybrid Threats,” War on the Rocks, July 28, 2014. Available at: http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/ on-not-so-new-warfarepolitical-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/

²⁰Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith. Project “Russia and Hybrid Warfare: definitions, capabilities, scope and possible responses” report 1/2016. Aleksanteri Papers is an online working paper series published by Kikimora Publications at the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland. ISSN 1457-9251

²¹Jacob W. Kipp, “Smart Defence from New Threats: Future War from a Russian Perspective: Back to the Future After the War on Terror,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, no. 1 (January-March 2014): 36-62.

²²Jacob Kipp, The Methodology of Foresight and Forecasting in Soviet Military Affairs (Fort Leavenworth,KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1988), http://www.dtic. mil/dtic/tr/ fulltext/u2/a196677.pdf

²³Gobi, Jayavardhana, Rajkumar Buyya, Slaven Marusic,Marimuthu Palaniswami (2013). Internet of Things (IoT): A Vision, Architectural Elements, and Future Directions Journal Future Generation Computer Systems. Volume 29 Issue 7, September, Pages 1645-1660 Elsevier Science Publishers, The Netherlands.

²⁴Cederberg, Aapo, (2015). Geneva Centre for Security Policy Institute, presented in PSSI’s NATO Summer School, Měřín, July 23, 2015.

²⁵Ruslan Puhkov, “The Myth of Hybrid Warfare,” Nezavisimaya Voyennoye Obozreniye, May 29, 2015, Available at: http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html.

²⁶Alibaba: After the Float. In: The Economist, 06/09/2014, p. 60.

²⁷“Forecast: The Internet of Things, Worldwide, 2013,” Gartner, Inc., Nov. 18, 2013, Available at: https://www.gartner.com/doc/2625419/forecast-internet-thingsworldwide

²⁸Johnson, “Soviet Strategy For War in Space;” Johnson, “Soviet Offensive Satellite Systems, A First Step.”

²⁹Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China and Russia Jointly Submitted the Draft Treaty on PPWT to the Conference on Disarmament,” February 12, 2008, Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/jkxw/ t408634.htm.

³⁰General Carl Von Clausewitz (2009). On War: The Complete Edition. Wildside Press LLC. pp. 144,

³¹DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication 1-02. 2008.

³²US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, p. 3-13 (page 69 of the PDF) FAS Intelligence Resource Program

³³DGemO doktrin för gemensamma operation. (2005). Stockholm: Försvarsmakten: pp. 63 – 66

³⁴The Swedish doctrines referred to consists of a hierarchy covering the strategic, operational and tactical levels

³⁵Strange, Joe and Iron, Richard (2005). Understanding centres of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Stockholm: Department of War Studies, Swedish National Defence College: pp. 35

³⁶Strange, Joe and Iron, Richard (2005). Understanding centres of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Stockholm: Department of War Studies, Swedish National Defence College: pp. 35

³⁷Alexander H. Montgomery Department of Political Science, Reed College ahm@ reed.edu Available at: https://www.scribd.com/document/266421120/1-2

³⁸Strange, Joe and Richard Iron (2005). Understanding centres of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Stockholm: Department of War Studies, Swedish National Defence College

³⁹Vego, Milan (2008). Joint operational warfare: theory and practice. 1. ed. Stockholm: National Defence College

⁴⁰Jen Weedon, "Beyond ‘Cyber War': Russia's Use of Strategic Cyber Espionage and Information Operations in Ukraine," Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine, Ed. Kenneth Geers, (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2015), pages 67-77.

⁴¹Pasi Eronen. Russian Hybrid Warfare: How to Confront a New Challenge to the West Foundation for Defence of Democracies Washington, Dc, 2016 p 6

⁴²Critical Juncture by Yaakov Lappin BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 812, April 26, 2018

⁴³Zheng, Denise E. and Carter, William A. (2015). Leveraging the Internet of Things for a More Efficient and Effective Military. A Report of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Strategic Technologies Program September.

⁴⁴Refugees International, press release, July 17, 2008

⁴⁵Emil Avdaliani Despite His Victory, Putin’s Problems Will Grow BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 795, April 15, 2018

⁴⁶Published 12:36 PM ET Mon, 18 June 2018 Updated 6:22 PM ET Mon, 18 June 2018 CNBC.com