Journal of Defense Management
Open Access

Brief Note on Military Theories

Jessica Lorn^{* *}Correspondence: Jessica Lorn, Department of Political Sciences, International Society of Military Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden, Email:

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Military operational theory is a study of all aspects of warfare, including its patterns and underlying structure, as well as the interrelationships among its numerous components and factors. It also includes the political, economic, and social linkages that exist inside a civilization and across societies that contribute to conflict and war. It also covers the use of armed action to prevent a war from exploding.

There are several military theories. Based on their intended use, extent of war as a general concept is addressed. Theories of military art and the theory of warfare operational warfare (or operational strategy) explaining is the focus of the both art and tactics. Methods, planning, preparation, and the execution of action, in that order, Clausewitz realised that each period has its unique type of conflict. As a result of a mix of the drastic changes in the worldwide security environment, negotiation, internal politics, ideology, economics, and the revolutionary technological developments, a new philosophy of the war arises.

Any theory's main goal is to clarify the ideas and notions that have become the jumbled and intertwined only after the terms and can one hope to achieve anything once concepts have been defined? Make any progress in analyzing the problem clearly and simply, with the reader in mind to express the one's point of view. Clausewitz held the belief that the theories of primary goal are to cast the constant basis of the illumination for all things it ought to be. It demonstrates how one thing is connected to another and to distinguish vital and irrelevant thin. The search of strategic objectives is the primary goal of the military operations drawn from the operational art. The political authority was held by the king and his knights. Politics and battle were inextricably interwoven; therefore the king personally led his forces into combat. However, when states and administrations evolved to support big national armies led by a professional military class (rather than the monarch) pursuing large-scale operations, a chasm arose between the political "reason" for wars and military aims. Clausewitz figuratively described the difference between these two aspects as two of three tendencies in his "paradoxical trinity." The diverse links between the inclination of war as a policy of instrument and the war as a game of chance and probability is exemplified by political reason and military objectives. With the modern warfare, the gap between the two tendencies has grown even wider.

Operational art's approach is to arranging strategic activities in time, area, and purpose reflects the distributive nature of the modern combat. The use of the forces in deep scattered operations is a stamp of modern warfare. Prior to the modern operations, warfare was characterised by the use of a "single point" tactic. According to the soviet military philosopher, soldiers have marched and gathered for battle in a dense mass on a single place in the theatre of operations for the century, due to logistical and command and the control limitations, this was the most efficient use of the force at the time. During the Napoleonic Wars, this skill reached its pinnacle as corps manoeuvred.

The theory behind a "single point" strategy has changed as a result of the modern circumstances. Due to the enhanced lethality of modern weaponry, concentrated armies were penalised with extremely high casualties. Modern artillery and the trench fortifications, on the other hand, encouraged the armies to disperse their forces. Other advancements, such as the railroad and the telegraph, enabled armies to perform the operations that were widely scattered but coordinated.