Journal of Geography  & Natural Disasters
Open Access

Civil-Military Collaborative Governance in Disaster Management as a Defense Diplomacy Strategy for the Government of Indonesia

Yanto Manurung^*, Syamsul Maarif, Tahan Samuel Lumban Toruan and Yoedhi Swastanto ^*Correspondence: Yanto Manurung, Department of Defence, Defence University of the Republic of Indonesia, Bogor, Indonesia, Tel: +628122159658, Email:

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Introduction

Natural disasters are one of the most real threats to humanity. However, natural disasters receive relatively little attention in discussions on national and international defense. The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) regularly reports natural disaster statistics on a global level. Based on data from CRED, from 2000 to 2019, 7,348 natural disaster events were recorded worldwide. In total, during this period natural disasters claimed an estimated 1.14 million lives, resulting in an average of 60,000 deaths per year. Apart from claiming lives, in this period, natural disasters affected 4 billion people, when viewed in economic indicators. Because economically, natural disasters cause economic losses of around US$ 2.97 trillion worldwide. Meanwhile, the geographic distribution of natural disasters over the past decade shows that Asia is the most affected region, followed by the Americas, Europe, Africa and Oceania. In terms of countries, China, the United States, the Philippines, India and Indonesia are the top five most frequently hit by natural disasters [1].

Indonesia's Disaster Information Data records the frequency of natural disaster events that occurred in Indonesia from 2008- 2022 [2]. The data reveals the total number of natural disasters that occurred, the number of victims who died, and the number of victims affected from 2008 to 2020 as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Total natural disasters for the period 2008-2022 in Indonesia
Note: () Total Natural Disasters, () Victims Died, () Affected Victims (mark × 1000)

The data shows that the Government of Indonesia's disaster management in 2008 was the worst among other years, this can be seen from the high number of victims affected, but on the other hand the level of disaster intensity was the lowest when compared to other years. As for 2011, there was an improvement in terms of handling it. In 2011, although the intensity of natural disasters was higher than in 2008, the number of victims affected was the lowest compared to other years. Even so, in 2018 the quality of the Government of Indonesia's disaster management experienced another decline. This can be seen from the largest increase in the death toll of 6,240 people in this period, this death toll is the largest when compared to other years in that period. This condition can be said to be an ironic condition, but it is understandable, because apart from being in the top 5 countries with the most natural disasters, Indonesia is also in the top 3 countries having the highest risk in overcoming natural disasters, below the Philippines and India. This highest risk rating means that the quality of the Indonesian Government's natural disaster management is still low when compared to other countries Indonesia is also in the top 3 countries with the highest risk of dealing with natural disasters, below the Philippines and India. This highest risk rating means that the quality of the Indonesian Government's natural disaster management is still low when compared to other countries Indonesia is also in the top 3 countries with the highest risk of dealing with natural disasters, below the Philippines and India. This highest risk rating means that the quality of the Indonesian Government's natural disaster management is still low when compared to other countries [3].

In improving the quality of their disaster management, countries and international organizations have developed disaster management structures, although the quality of these structures varies from one country to another and from one international organization to another. However, it should be noted that developing countries tend to lack comprehensive and stable civilian structures to deal with disasters, therefore the quality of disaster management in these countries often depends almost entirely on the military and international civil and military assistance. In developed countries, disaster management structures consisting of civil society are formed and operate at relatively high levels of government, however, in the event of a major disaster [4].

When viewed from its structure, it can be seen that the Government of Indonesia is included in the developed countries in terms of disaster management structure, because the Indonesian Government has a civil society structure in disaster management. The structure of civil society that plays a role in disaster management in Indonesia can be seen in the civil institutions that administer disaster management that have been formed by the Government of Indonesia. Disaster management institutions have been established since 1945, in that year they were still in the form of the War Victims' Family Assistance Agency (BPKKP). This agency was established on August 20, 1945 which has a focus on helping war victims and families of victims during the war of independence. However, as it develops, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Civil Institutions for the Implementation of Countermeasures Disaster in Indonesia

The Aceh earthquake and tsunami tragedy in 2004 was the most difficult disaster faced by the Government of Indonesia. This is because, this natural disaster caused 220 thousand Indonesian people to become victims [5]. The figure is the largest when compared to the data on fatalities for the period 2008 to 2020 which is shown in Figure 1. This countermeasure effort, if we imagine, requires extra attention from the Government of Indonesia, coupled with the fact that the presence of a separatist movement in Aceh was initiated by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), which is considered to disturb the sovereignty of the Government of Indonesia.

GAM, known internationally as ASNLF (Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front) is a movement organization that proclaimed Aceh's independence on December 4, 1976 in Pidie. Some literature states that the emergence of this movement organization was motivated by the disappointment of the Acehnese people over the unresolved Darul Islam problem, as well as the marginalization of the Acehnese by the Government of Indonesia over its policy of oil and gas exploitation in the Aceh region [6]. In overcoming this problem, a number of defense efforts were carried out by the Government of Indonesia, starting from implementing the Military Operations Area (DOM), to diplomacy with GAM leaders. However, until the earthquake and tsunami disaster in Aceh on December 26, 2004, these efforts had not been successful [7].

Efforts to overcome the problems arising from the emergence of GAM, carried out by the Government of Indonesia showed progress when the Government of Indonesia collaborated with the military and Bakornas PBP (the disaster management agency at that time) to address the problem of the Aceh earthquake and tsunami in 2004. Some observers saw Government policies Indonesia is very appropriate, apart from the momentum factor, the presence of the Government through the collaboration of Bakornas PBP and the Military, shows the ideal function of the Indonesian Government in the Aceh region. The presence of the Government there functions as an actor that can solve problems, present a framework for order, and distance society from the deplorable conditions caused by the natural disasters that have occurred [8]. However, in addition to carrying out its ideal function, researchers see the presence of Bakornas PBP and the military in managing natural disasters in Aceh in 2004, which were positioned by the Government of Indonesia as a strategy to defend national sovereignty from GAM interference.

Several studies of national defense literature state that strategies to defend national sovereignty can be carried out in many ways, but the most common is to have one or all of the 3 types of power based on the concept developed by Joseph Nye [9]. In his work entitled, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (1991) and The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone (2003), Joseph Nye identified three types of power which include hard power, economic power, and soft power. Each of the three describes a unique mechanism, which allows one country to regulate or shape the actions of other actors. Actors here can be other countries, separatist movement organizations, or actors who can threaten the defense or sovereignty of the state. Of the three types of power, hard power is the most established and involves the use of pressure [10]. The explanation of the three types of power is as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Types of Power to Defend State Sovereignty According to Josep Nye [10]

Although hard power is the most established force, but its effectiveness is not always perfect. Likewise, as shown by the actions of the Government of Indonesia in implementing DOM in the Aceh region, this action did not succeed in bringing peace, on the contrary it gave rise to resistance and claimed lives. The Aceh Human Rights (HAM) caring forum released a number of cases resulting from the Indonesian Government's policy of implementing DOM in the Aceh region as follows as shown in Table 3.

Number of Cases during the DOM Period in Aceh

The collaboration between the military and Bakornas PBP that was handed down by the Government of Indonesia in responding to the Aceh earthquake and tsunami in 2004 was different in terms of strength compared to DOM. This act of collaboration does not show a sanction given by the Government of Indonesia to GAM or the people of Aceh in general. Likewise with strength, economic power, the collaboration does not seek to provide any incentives or economic benefits to GAM and the people of Aceh. This is because the emergence of GAM is clearly an unwanted action by the Government of Indonesia, therefore the provision of incentives is something that is biased if it occurs. Researchers assess that this collaboration is one of the strengths of the soft power of the Government of Indonesia which is used to overcome threats to sovereignty from GAM. The strength of soft power, defined by several researchers such as Wingers [9] as defense diplomacy. The defense diplomacy is defined as the peaceful use of state defense institutions to co-opt other state actors or government agencies in order to achieve the desired results [9].

Based on the description of the background above, it is certainly interesting to discuss why researchers assess collaboration between the military-civilian in responding to the Aceh earthquake and tsunami in 2004 as an act of soft power or defense diplomacy of the Government of Indonesia. Therefore, in this paper, the researcher is interested in conducting research with the title, "Civil- Military Collaborative Governance in Disaster Management as a Defense Diplomacy Strategy for the Government of Indonesia (Case Study of the Aceh Earthquake and Tsunami in 2004).

In this study, researchers will reveal the suitability of Indonesian government policies through civil-military collaboration in managing the Aceh earthquake and tsunami disaster with the theory of defense diplomacy put forward by Winger as a state defense policy of the Government of Indonesia. Based on the research of researchers, there is no literature that sees civil- military collaborative actions in disaster management carried out by the Government of Indonesia that are compatible with the theory of defense diplomacy put forward by Winger as a national defense policy. The research conducted by Mujiburrohman [11] focuses on the influence of civil-military collaboration on food security in the East Java region. Whereas, Dilahwangsa et al., [12] focuses on the influence of intergovernmental cooperation on the defense of ASEAN member countries.

Materials and Methods

Materials

Collaborative governance: Collaborative governance is one type of derived concept that exists in the governance paradigm. In general, collaborative governance is governance that emphasizes collaborative processes. The earliest use of “collaborative governance” was published in 1978 by Howey and Joyce and Yarger and Yarger in the educational journal Theory into Practice, the term was used to refer to a new structure to facilitate teaching center services with a community-based model [13]. The concept of collaborative governance is defined as a concept that has elements of integration, coordination, cooperation, and working synergistically [14]. The elements are described as follows:

• Collaborative governance provides an overview of synergies in the dynamics of collaboration, namely in the combination of shared capacities that move together and complement each other in a dynamic and sustainable motion.

• On collaborative governance also explained about the integration that occurs in the dynamics of collaboration, namely between various knowledge that is integrated with social values, as well as procedural relationships and institutional arrangements between collaborating organizations.

• Coordination is also part of the collaborative governance process, especially at the beginning of formation and the dynamics that combine and unite the different participating stakeholders.

• Likewise with cooperation (cooperation) which is interpreted as a commitment, a form of seriousness to collaborate, a sustainable joint agreement that forms a regime in certain governance [15].

This meaning does not place collaboration and other components as different entities, but instead places other components as part of the collaboration process which has different portions and levels of practice. This was confirmed by Emerson, Nabatchi [16] which integrates various actions in governance in one construction of actions that cross the boundaries (cross-boundary) of public bodies. The interpretation of these components in common with collaboration includes focus, interaction and recognition of environmental influences such as: organization, programs created and executed, and work teams, while the difference between collaboration and these components lies in several basic interpretations, namely:

• The collaboration process is a group process that is influenced by decision-making, leadership, negotiation and task orientation of each stakeholder/implementer in collective action.

• Results and effectiveness in coordination, shared responsibility, and novelty.

In this study, an understanding of the concept of collaborative governance is important. The concept of collaborative governance is used to make readings related to programs carried out by the military and civilians in responding to the Aceh earthquake and tsunami in 2004. In this study, researchers will describe the suitability of the military-civilian program with elements of collaborative governance.

Theory of defense diplomacy: Defense Diplomacy is one of the Theories of Defense Science. This theory combines 2 terms which consist of the term diplomacy and the term defense. Literally, based on the Merriam-Webster dictionary, diplomacy can be interpreted as: 1) The art and practice of negotiating between nations; 2) Skills in handling affairs without causing hostility. Meanwhile, the literal definition of defense, according to the same dictionary, means an action to defend or defend. Therefore, defense diplomacy here can be interpreted as an action to defend or defend by negotiating between nations or without causing hostility. This definition is in line with the definition expressed by Wingers [9] that state defense diplomacy is the peaceful use of state defense institutions to co-opt other state actors or government agencies in order to achieve the desired results. However, based on the description, this definition is still not clear. He explained that the definition of defense diplomacy would be clearer if we understood the concept of soft power as proposed by Joseph Nye. According to him, defense diplomacy is another term for soft power put forward by Joseph Nye. Soft power in the definition put forward by Joseph Nye is positioned as one of 3 types of power which includes hard power, economic power, and soft power (Table 2). Soft power is identified as a force that influences the actions of an actor (individual, government, private institution, etc.) to comply with the wishes of other actors, because he believes that the other actor wants what is best for him, if he does not heed the wishes of other actors.

In this study, an understanding of the theory of defense diplomacy is important. The theory of defense diplomacy is used to assess the function of civil-military collaboration in managing the Aceh earthquake and tsunami disaster in 2004. This function certainly carries the interests of the Government of Indonesia to maintain state sovereignty in the Aceh region which before the disaster was disturbed by GAM. In this study, in the context of the theory of defense diplomacy, the Government of Indonesia is seen as an actor who has an interest in protecting its sovereignty from interference by GAM and has soft power over GAM, therefore GAM needs to adjust its actions to suit the wishes of the Government of Indonesia, if they do not adjust their actions as wanted by the Government of Indonesia.

Methods

This research is a qualitative research type, which focuses on decomposing data in a descriptive-deductive manner. In this type of research, the authors comprehensively describe civil-military collaboration policies in responding to the Aceh earthquake and tsunami disaster in 2004. As a defense diplomacy strategy for the Government of Indonesia from threats to national sovereignty from GAM. Therefore, in this study, researchers will link the existing facts with the elements contained in the theory of defense diplomacy. The approach in this study uses a case study approach. This approach focuses on in-depth, detailed and detailed investigation or examination of a particular event or particular case to be investigated. This approach aims to understand and explain the cause-and-effect relationship of a case [17]. In this study, as previously discussed, researchers chose the case of the Aceh earthquake and tsunami in 2004. The data in this study are sourced from scientific articles and official government or organization reports related to this case.

Results and Discussion

Understanding civil-military collaboration in responding to the Aceh earthquake and tsunami in 2004 in the theory of defense diplomacy, means seeing this policy as a policy that carries the interests of the government to secure national sovereignty from GAM in peaceful ways. According to the elements of soft power. Therefore, in this study, researchers need to prove the following: 1) That the collaboration carried out by Bakornas PBP and the Indonesian military in responding to the Aceh earthquake and tsunami in 2004 was a policy aimed at protecting Indonesia's national sovereignty from GAM; 2) That the collaboration carried out for this purpose is carried out in peaceful ways in accordance with the elements of soft power.

Bakornas PBP-Military collaboration aims to maintain sovereignty and become soft power for GAM

The Aceh earthquake and tsunami disaster occurred on December 26, 2004, this disaster occurred in the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's leadership (SBY) and Vice President Jusuf Kalla. These two Indonesian leaders, since their election as President, have been known as leaders who put democratic values first [18]. This, of course, cannot be separated from the influence of their election as the first President and Vice President directly elected by the people, which is a manifestation of democracy in Indonesia [19]. The leadership of SBY and Jusuf Kalla succeeded in bringing peace to the people of Aceh, which was marked by the agreement reached with GAM in Helsinki on 15 August 2015.

This agreement occurred after several efforts made by the Government of Indonesia during the era of SBY and Jusuf Kalla's leadership succeeded in generating trust in GAM circles. On the day of the tsunami, namely 26 December 2004, President SBY immediately declared a natural disaster and ordered various departments and ministries to mobilize available resources aimed at responding to emergencies as well as the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. In addition, through the Vice Presidential Decree, the Government of Indonesia assigned Bakornas PBP to lead the resources owned by the Government of Indonesia through Aceh [20]. In carrying out this resource mobilization effort, Bakornas PBP collaborated with the Indonesian military, which totaled 27,000 personnel, as well as the foreign military, which amounted to 16,000 personnel [21]. Bakornas PBP collaboration system and the military in managing the Aceh earthquake and tsunami disaster as shown in Figure 2 [22].

Figure 2: Bakornas PBP and Military Collaboration System in Aceh earthquake and tsunami disaster management
Note: Processed from various secondary data sources (Departments/Agencies of NAD Province and City of Banda Aceh, August 2005) in Mirza [22]

Apart from the Government of Indonesia, the international community is also providing assistance to Indonesia considering that Aceh is the area that was most severely affected by the destructive impacts of the tsunami among other regions or countries [23]. The international community recognizes that the support provided by the international community is the largest international response in responding to natural disasters, involves the largest number of donors, and is the fastest financial response to disasters. Coordination of international assistance is also led by Bakornas PBP with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) [24]. Financially, it is estimated that around $7.7 billion has been collected to fund the Aceh earthquake and tsunami relief during the emergency response period [21].

Thus, in the response to the earthquake and tsunami disaster in Aceh in 2004, we can see that the role of Bakornas PBP and the military is very important. Bakornas PBP's role is to distribute assistance from the Government of Indonesia and International Parties to the people of Aceh. Although research from Mirza [22] mentioned that the collaboration carried out by Bakornas PBP and the Military still had many obstacles, but their presence was enough to make the people of Aceh have sympathy for the Government of Indonesia.

This is also believed by GAM, which can be seen from its political steps in agreeing to a ceasefire with the Government of Indonesia [25]. GAM's willingness to carry out a ceasefire can be seen when the Government of Indonesia and GAM agreed for the second time since 2003 to carry out diplomacy in January 2005 which was facilitated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) organization led by the former President of Finland, Martii Ahtisaari [26]. The diplomacy carried out by GAM and RI was facilitated by CMI, namely by taking place in Helsinki, Finland. This location was chosen because it was far from the press, CMI assessed that information from the press would lead to further conflict for the people of Aceh. If news spreads, there will be many perceptions and arguments that will come, even though the peace negotiations have not yet been completed. Therefore, the negotiations took place in Helsinki and were closed [27].

While GAM and Indonesian government representatives held several diplomatic meetings until the peak on November 15, 2005, the two parties signed a memorandum of understanding in Helsinki [28]. The civil-military collaboration that existed at Bakornas PBP and the Military in tackling the Aceh earthquake and tsunami in 2004 continues to play an important role, as the soft power of the Government of Indonesia. Within a week after the earthquake and tsunami, Bakornas PBP, Satkorlak PBP, and Satlak PBP assisted by the TNI-POLRI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Polisian Negara Republic Indonesia) along with other policy actors struggled to reduce the number of victims so that they would not increase [29]. This effort was carried out through medical action and victim evacuation. In strengthening this effort, the government appointed the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare as the head of the Satkorlak. Then, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army (Wakasad) as deputy 1 and Deputy Governor of Aceh as deputy 2 who has the role of restoring government functions in areas affected by the Aceh earthquake and tsunami [30].

GAM believes that if they continue their armed struggle in the midst of a very grieving atmosphere and the growing sympathy of the people of Aceh for the Government of Indonesia through post-disaster assistance led by Bakornas PBP and the military, they will instead lose sympathy from the people of Aceh who are grieving. In addition, GAM also believes that if they persist in their attitude of not wanting to make peace with the Government of Indonesia, they will be criticized by international institutions which distributed a lot of aid after the Aceh earthquake and tsunami in 2004. GAM, which intends to internationalize the Aceh issue, does not want to develop bad image by blocking the entry of Indonesian and International Government assistance through collaboration between Bakornas PBP and the Military [18].

In this case we can see that the Government of Indonesia places the collaboration between Bakornas PBP and the Military as their soft power. If GAM blocks this collaboration, then GAM will get a bad image from the international community, which will certainly be very detrimental to them. As for other risks, GAM will receive sanctions from other hard power forces, considering that the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh have touched international issues, there is a potential for GAM to be sanctioned by the international community through the United Nations (UN).

Conclusion

Natural disasters are a real threat to humanity, inseparable from the people of Indonesia. The natural disaster occurred in Aceh in 2004, which was the heaviest disaster faced by the Government of Indonesia. This disaster took many lives for the people of Indonesia, moreover the Indonesian Government is also facing a threat to its sovereignty from the presence of GAM in the Aceh region. In its response efforts, the Government of Indonesia ordered Bakornas PBP to lead the disaster management process, in collaboration with the military. However, this effort, in addition to being seen as the embodiment of the government's ideal function, this effort can be seen as a defense diplomacy strategy for the Government of Indonesia against the threat of GAM's sovereignty. The presence of Bakornas PBP and the Indonesian Military in the Aceh region to deal with the Aceh earthquake and tsunami disaster was utilized by the Government of Indonesia as soft power. The presence of Bakornas PBP and the military forced GAM to call for a ceasefire. If GAM does not take this step, the Acehnese and international community's support for GAM will potentially decrease, this lack of support places GAM in a disadvantaged position. In the end, the ceasefire steps taken by GAM led them to peace with the Government of Indonesia which was marked by the Helsinki agreement in 2005. Acehnese and international support for GAM has the potential to diminish, this lack of support places GAM in a disadvantaged position. In the end, the ceasefire steps taken by GAM led them to peace with the Government of Indonesia which was marked by the Helsinki agreement in 2005. Acehnese and International support for GAM has the potential to diminish, this lack of support places GAM in a disadvantaged position. In the end, the ceasefire steps taken by GAM led them to peace with the Government of Indonesia which was marked by the Helsinki agreement in 2005.

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