Journal of Defense Management
Open Access

Commentary on Biodefense Enterprise Capabilities to Prevent Bioincidents

Doryan Karuna^{* *}Correspondence: Doryan Karuna, Department of Defense Management, Jamia Millia Islamia University, Jamia Nagar, Okhla, New Delhi, India, Email:

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Description

Pathogens have originated and spread throughout history, and as the world becomes more urbanised, travel rises, and the temperature and habitats change, the risk from these infections increases. There is no reason to believe that nation-states or terrorist organisations won't continue to pursue biological weapons on their own. The technological barriers to obtaining such weapons will be lower because to developments in the life sciences, and the pool of people with the necessary abilities to use threats will grow.

The United States considers fighting both deliberate biological threats and threats resulting from naturally occurring and unintentional epidemics within the definition of biodefense. With this strategy, the US government can completely employ, integrate, and coordinate the biodefense business and guarantee the best possible utilisation of all available biodefense resources.

Infectious diseases do not respect borders

A disease danger anywhere is a disease risk anywhere due to the greater likelihood of germs developing, reappearing, and spreading in a linked world. Whether through the movement of people, animals, plants, or through the environment, infectious illnesses trespass over national boundaries without discrimination. Because the United States cannot combat biological threats domestically without addressing them globally, the U.S. Government will reduce biological events both domestically and globally through collaborating with our allies abroad. Also, we'll work to strengthen our capacity to stop the importation of infectious diseases from abroad, especially those that impact people, animals, plants, and the environment, through inbound commodities and passengers.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the outbreaks of UG99 Stem Rust and African Swine Fever, as well as the Ebola outbreaks in 2014, 2018, and 2021, show that the U.S. Government must be ready to act quickly when outbreaks occur. Engaging at the local, national, and international levels is necessary for a quick reaction in order to mobilise support for and carry out context-relevant interventions over the duration of the response. Additionally, the United States must continue to exercise catalytic global leadership by collaborating with multilateral organisations, foreign governments, partners in the public and private sectors, and local communities to build health security systems around the globe.

• COVID 19 has illustrated the serious effects that biological incidents can have on vital supply chains and infrastructure. The impact of a biological incident could have an impact on a wide range of industries. The U.S. government must collaborate with other sectors to strengthen the resilience of vital supply chains and infrastructure, especially those that are most important for mounting a successful response.

• This strategy encourages participation in biodefense on a national and international level by all levels of government and society. Diverse sectors are involved in assessment, prevention, preparation, response, and recovery, including the medical, nonproliferation, and counterproliferation industries, as well as the human, animal, and plant health, emergency response, scientific and technical, industrial, academic, diplomatic, defence and security, and social and behavioural sciences.

• To stop a biological event and prepare for the next one, collaboration with SLTT entities, international organisations, nongovernmental groups, communities, the private sector, and the general public is essential. For collaboration with local and international partners to be successful, there must be transparency in all communications, data sharing, surveillance, and reaction activities.

Capabilities of biodefense enterprises

• Encourage the use of strategies to stop or slow the spread of infectious diseases.

• Boost international capabilities for global health security to stop local bioincidents from spreading globally.

• Disrupt, deny, deter, or otherwise stop nation-state and nonstate actors from pursuing, obtaining, or using biological weapons, associated materials, or their delivery systems.

• To prevent bioincidents and lower biological risks related to developments in biotechnology and life sciences research and development, strengthen biosafety and biosecurity practises and oversight.