Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs
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Peacekeeping Operations and Growing Global Terrorism in East and West Africa: A Call for New Re-Engagement

Niyonkuru Fulgence^{* *}Correspondence: Niyonkuru Fulgence, Department of Social Administration, University of Development Studies, Ghana, West Africa, Tel: 234000000000, Email:

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Introduction

In recent years, the United Nations, African Union, European Union, and other major international security organizations have embarked on peacekeeping operations in countries under war [1]. In addition to what has been the norm of African security issues for years, terrorism has emerged as one of the greatest challenging security threats as it affects the entire international system. These missions' deployments are geared towards promoting peace, protecting innocent lives, and facilitating humanitarian aid where needed. Peacekeeping missions are arrayed in places where national security forces are incapable to bring to ending hostility or end deadly armed conflicts capable of escalating and ravaging people’s lives. Tardy acknowledges how these operations have done well to shape the defense and security policies of governments and their stakeholders. As at first, the UN-mandated military operations were limited to some activities, it has been necessary to adopt more stringent approaches and strategies requiring fully equipped combat units, a real armed forces to deal with radicalized terrorist fighters operating across borders [2]. In Africa, the emergence of terrorism, violent extremism, jihadist fighters, and other forms of religious radicalized groups have become a real challenge to the traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations. The nature and impact of these groups have made it necessary for policymakers to reinvent the wheels and rethink the future makeup of peacekeeping operations or military operations on the continent and how henceforth their operations should be. The recent deployment of peacekeeping missions in some countries was a result of activities being posed by either terrorism or armed groups (rebels fighting the government). The attacks of 11 September 2011 on the USA became a confirmation of a global security threat that ought to be handled differently, beyond what a mere peacekeeping mission could do. East, West Africa, and the horn of Africa (Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso) have been more hit by this phenomenon and most deployed missions in these countries have been meeting setbacks to adequately end once for all, terrorist activities in these areas. Unlike previous years where UN peacekeeping missions were deployed to just be in between fighting belligerent, the current security challenges this peacekeeping mission fighting with is an organized international body, well equipped and capable of revamping its war arsenal at any time, compelling the traditional peacekeeping ideology to adjust its policy and approaches to face in the equal share this trend. Instead of mere light operations to cease hostility, fighting terrorism has imposed and called upon new mechanisms involving well-coordinated multi-actor, high-intensity, and financially sustainable operations. Paradoxically, the trending issues in the UN peacekeeping missions in different parts of the continent are about a sentiment of rejection either from the people (Republic Democratic of Congo where the local population put on fire the building of the UN peacekeeping mission) or by the government (Malian government and its population wanting out the peacekeeping mission, especially the French troops and Somali government that wants AMISOM troops to come to end).

The study intends to review the anatomy of peacekeeping missions and counter-terrorism missions in West and East Africa. This will appraise the level of progress and inform on the best-suited approaches the UN and regional bodies should embark on to adequately face terrorism and prevent its escalation on the continent. Given the nature of the current security threat the continent is facing today and having seen the level of success of all attempted interventions to bring back peace to the war-torn country or terrorist hits countries, the study tends to inquire reasons behind such failure (done by mandated peacekeeping missions or military operations) [3]. As both an informative and solution-oriented study, using mostly available secondary data and interviews done in key countries of interest, the study aims at formulating recommendations likely to help national and international bodies involved in this war on terrorism within the current context, to devise means and strategies, best-suited policies that would create a paradigm shift in the whole area of counter-terrorism and peacekeeping.

Problem statement

Africa’s underdevelopment is linked to the absence of lasting peace. The necessity of peace is found in its relation to development. This explains why countries at war, yet seeking development often strive to achieve some relative level of peace. Cocodia asserts that in the absence of peace and security, there is no incentive for people to undertake productive investments in the legal economy, as the likelihood of the return on investment is minimal. This major contribution to development galvanizes employment opportunities and makes more citizens stakeholders in peace. One of the core objectives of the African Union is to provide peace and security to its member countries and one major strategy to curb violence and war is by means of the peacekeeping mission, peace enforcement, peace building, and support. Amidst current trending security issues in key African countries, available abundant research clearly demonstrates the inadequacy of traditional and conventional UN-mandated peacekeeping missions whose scope of operations is limited to adequately handle complex security issues as far as terrorism and violent extremism are concerned [4]. The data available on growing terrorist operations in many African countries indicate that more equipped human resources and war logistics are needed to adequately face this dilemma which is far beyond the ability of the UN PC mission to handle. The failure of these UN PC missions’ operations has been attributed to factors such as government weak consent for their operations, declined legitimacy of the UN peacekeeping missions among the people affected by the conflict (R.D Congo), or operating in a political context that their mandate is not suited for (Mali) leading to the decline of benefit the people were supposed to get from them and also exposing themselves to great risks, culminating in high-level lives loss. In these efforts of improving the security in some terrorists and engaged war zones, international military operations which, technically have helped in curbing the terrorist's expansions in more countries, have rather yielded adverse results as it has strengthened the commitment of these terrorist networks now targeting their interests in the region. This is the case of French intervention in West Africa which is raising an anti-French sentiment across West Africa. War on terrorism is failing due to the simple fact that, these operations, being UN mandated or from the regional organizations’ bodies such as AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, EAC, being from international security organizations such as NATO or its allies always tackle existing problems and not root causes. In these operations which are normally time bound, the enemy may retrieve not as a sign of defeat but to reinvigorate its strength and come back more fiercely violent when these missions’ mandate has ended. The root causes of terror attacks are domestic, with origins in each country’s history. Notes that it is always a combination of factors: Cultural, political, social, economic, and religious. None of these PC missions are concerned about reconciling the history of the people and in the long run, their mission.

Why does it matter?

The real purpose of conducting this study is to assess the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations mandated by major international and regional security organizations in combating terrorism in Africa. The study aims at pinpointing what has been the level of success of these peacekeeping missions in countries under war, what accounts for their apparent inability to accomplish their mission, and their failure to bring about lasting peace and finding sustainable security solutions to the continent under siege of a resilient organized global terrorism [5]. The study will dip deep into the anatomy of the current terrorist groups in our thematic area of study, to understand root causes, and their agenda and evaluate the possible implications of their activities on the world system. The rationale behind the study is to utilize findings to formulate recommendations that may guide the United Nations, regional organizations, and international security organizations involved in combatting and countering terrorism to devise strategies and means best suited and accurate for the nature of the security challenges on the ground today. The study thrives to find answers on issues related to rapid and growing terrorism in the Sahel and West Africa despite long-lived and ongoing peacekeeping missions and military operations. The study will seek answers to the ongoing rejection of peacekeeping missions and military operations by governments and/or by citizens and what accounts for their apparent missing consent, leading to the calling off of their missions.

Scope

The nature of the topic of our study is generally broad and to effectively comprehend all the dynamics of what the study talks about, it requires extensive time and resources to gather data and analyze it to come out with very representative information. The research will be limited to studying selected ongoing peacekeeping missions in Africa and selected countries, namely MINUMSA in Mali, MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and AMISOM in Somalia [6]. The study will focus more on terrorist groups operating in West Africa with emphasis on Mali and its neighboring countries and also on terrorist groups operating in Somalia and its environs.

Africa has known several peacekeeping operations over years. The study which is limiting itself to three main peacekeeping missions will however draw some infernal data from other past or active peacekeeping missions to enrich the study. Being aware of the enormous nature of studying terrorism as a subject, the study will only limit itself to those specifically operating in our chosen thematic area of study.

Literature Review

What have been the UN peacekeeping missions all along

It is noteworthy to highlight what have been the United Nations peacekeeping operations since its inspection as a stabilization mission in areas of conflict and war since 1948. It was instituted as a separate body with a mandate to make peace and prevent conflict, peacekeeping was seen by Kenkel as a mission that saw transformation and adaptation as years went by. He classified Peacekeeping into 5 main stages namely, a classical peacekeeping mission sent to places of war and open conflict as an interposing force agreed upon by consent parties to act as neutralizers and agents of peace. Both Adebajo and Kenkel take this type of peacekeeping as inter-positional buffer forces belligerent minimizing contact between two warring parties.

After the cold war, UN peacekeeping had to deal with issues where they had to be involved in civilian matters. Also, it came to be a case where the UN did not have any possibility to go between warring parties ( Somali, Bosnia Herzegovina) it was more or less where no agreement between the warring parties was reached on which a peacekeeping mandate could be based. Still, the UN remained neutral and impartial between the warring parties, without a mandate to stop the aggressor [7]. They were more involved in enforcing ceasefire agreements, helping refugee return, and ensuring they regained their former homes are fully reintegrated. The peacekeeping missions are deployed upon consent to: Prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders; stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement and where possible, they are mandated to assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements. Their mandate can include also, leading and walking through a government a transition to stable institutions, based on democratic principles, good governance, and economic development. According to the precepts and ordinances of the United Nations, peacekeeping missions are traditionally involved in the areas of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants; security sector reform and another rule of law-related activities; protection and promotion of human rights; electoral assistance; support for the restoration and extension of state authority; and where situations permit, participate in the promotion of social and economic recovery and development. Such missions have been deployed in many parts of the African continent since 1960 to intervene in diverse ways as stabilization operations to bring about peace and stability.

Adebajo notes that peacekeeping missions’ mandate as originally preconceived by the United Nations with its security council, has been undergoing some alteration as the nature and causes of insecurity they are meant to deal with have been also in constant change. Today, MONUSCO, MINUSMA, AMISOM, and MINUSCA, are among the robust peacekeeping missions in operation with stabilization mandates in Africa. Unlike older missions that focus on upholding peace agreements between warring parties, the above-cited PK missions are all charged with helping the state government manage security challengers and assert its primacy. In these missions, the UN is explicitly intervening on the side of the state, and peacekeepers are charged with using force in defense of state authority. In some countries these PK missions are more interventionist, moving away from their traditional mandate [8]. In cases where the state was quite absent to even coordinate humanitarian activities the UN mission replaced the local army to assist in protecting civilians and their livelihood. Subsequently, we saw peacekeeping operations moving away from mere interventionists to full participation in conflict resolution through armed activities with a hybrid approach: Combining permission to use force with enhanced civilian tasks in what is captured in the concept of peacebuilding. The current phase of the peacekeeping mission as puts it, is a deployment of forces on the ground and being supported by other regional and international organizations or security organizations to supplement the UN efforts.

Nature of major security treats in Africa today

The major African security challenge in recent years has been the growing terrorism. The African continent, being hit the hardest, has been a theatre of a varied range of terrorist activities. Many of these violent extremist activities are directed not only at states and governments but also at the points of interest of countries operating in Africa most especially the United States of America and some European Nations. Since 2009, terrorist attacks have claimed thousands of innocent deaths, kidnapped and abducted hundreds of children, and radicalized and armed them to launch suicide bombings and other ignominious terror activities [9]. Among the deadliest is Al-Shabaab operating from Somalia, Boko Haram operating mainly from Northern Nigeria and neighboring countries, Al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) with its different ramifications extending operations in West Africa, Mujao and Ansal Adine, and MNLA in Mali. Du Plessis and Allison argued that these terror groups taking forms of religious extremism have created networks and alliances all over on daily basis, derailing the original make-up of the peacekeeping actors (UN, EU, AU, and NATO).

Counter-terrorism versus peacekeeping operations

Given the widening gap in the traditional UN peacekeeping protocol and given the nature of the new security challenge the continent may need to face in the years ahead, it’s obvious none of the above-cited peacekeeping operations would adequately respond to the current need other than a new UN global counter-terrorism strategy which Karlshud suggests, will have to: Readjust and emphasize on addressing the conditions enabling the halt of the spread of terrorism, mechanisms that can prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms; strategies to strengthen strong state institutions by enhancing their capacity to deal with dire security challenges; coming up with a strong funding and support scheme that will enable the UN to play its role with no much financial hindrances and last, backing the UN’s role up in ensuring human rights and rule of law are preserved.

This led the UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon to launch in 2015, an action plan to halt violent extremism with particular reference to terrorism. This meant to rethink the peacekeeping operations mechanisms dating from the post-cold war era to adapt its new tactics to suit prevalent security challenges, not only for terrorism as this study focus on, but also on the overall peacekeeping operation as it could be best suited in the Republic Democratic of Congo, in Mali, in Somalia, the Central Africa Republic, in South Sudan and elsewhere; to not only be in-between belligerent but to realistically face and combat-hardened rebel groups whose activities could be transnational and stir security apparatus in more than one nation [10]. Obviously, terrorism came to be a global security issue and global response from not only the United Nations but also from regional organizations, international security organizations, and individual states must embark on the edification of a new way of dealing with it. The attacks on the USA on 11/9 ignited a new move from international security organizations and most world powers, a move towards considering violent extremism and terrorism as a real threat to their make-up of the existing traditional peacekeeping. Says, at the inter-state level, international organizations dealing with international or regional security such as the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union (EU) all perceived the 11 September events as a direct challenge to their very existence. To this end, they embarked upon policies aimed at suppressing the threat of terrorism or addressing its causes, going beyond what is already on the ground with the UN security agencies. From this time, it came to light that, peace operations and the ‘fight against terrorism are two different things that need to be handled differently. Never ever, none thought terrorism attacks of such magnitude could shape or alter the future nature of UN peacekeeping operations as the role of the UN was not defined by the nature of the 11 September attacks).

This paradigm shift in peace operations is necessitated by the fact that UN existing peacekeeping protocols are no more adequate to face all types of security challenges and NATO, for instance, ignited the process of redefining its role in combatting international terrorism by first identifying its major supporters (both states and non-states) [11]. Not only this change is needed in lieu of countering terrorism, but we have also been observing anti-UN peacekeeping mission protests where either the state declares non-grata the entire UN peacekeeping body or the population on streets protesting against the presence of these troops on their soil. Issues of lack of consent from either government or the population can bring the entire UN investment in these missions come to null.

Main peacekeeping missions in operation in Africa today

As of the year 2019, congressional research service (2019) confirmed a number of 7 active UN peacekeeping missions in different parts of Africa and 1 regional peacekeeping mission. These missions are The U.N. multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA-2014); the U.N. multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in Mali, the U.N. interim security force for ABYEI (UNISFA-2011), the U.N. mission in South Sudan (UNMISS-2011), the U.N. organization stabilization mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, MONUSCO-2010) that succeeded the U.N. organization mission in the DRC (MONUC); the U.N.-African Union mission in Darfur, the U.N. mission for the organization of a referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO-1991). In addition to these, the regional peacekeeping mission AMISOM operates in Somalia.

Among this UN peacekeeping mission, let’s review those working in terrorism-torn zones or dealing with open war with active armed groups.

Minusma-Mali: To understand the ongoing Malian security crises, one may go back to earlier events that hit the entire West African region and Northern Africa. Mali’s case is a mixture of insecurity scenarios with a multi-faceted origin [12]. To shorten the circuit, let the reference be to the Arab spring that ravaged most northern African countries. Jihadists’ fighters of the Al- Qaeda and its allies such as AQIM which had long declared their intention to create a caliphate in Northern Africa and impose a Sharia law have been nurturing other ramifications of radicalized fighters many among whom descended down-South after the collapse of Moammar Khadafi’s regime in Lybia. NATO intervention and dismantlement of their hideout pushed them to join those who had already started the war in Mali and due to easy arms proliferation and smuggling, Northern Mali fell in the hands of these numerous and differently motivated fighters the state could no longer handle on its own.

Many of these fighters who joined Mali were Tuaregs descent and came together to form the movement for oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). MUJAO later collaborated with Ansar Dine which was already operating in Northern Mali. They both supported the separatists' Movement National de Liberation de L’Azawad (MNLA). The MNLA was later supported by AQIM and they created lots of human damage to the Malian Government [13]. They attempted to move to the South and Oluwadare accounts how their activities caused massive destruction to the historical and cultural sites in Timbuktu. In Its resolution 2085, the UN security council authorized the deployment of a specialized mission, the Africa-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). This operation was not however able to make it as the government of Mali sought the intervention of France. It was said that AFISMA had no muscles required to face this enemy that was well equipped and well specialized. French operation (Barkhane operation) did wonderfully well to push the separatists to the hinterlands. Together with African Union, the UN later formed a more solid and better-equipped peacekeeping mission to supplement the Barkhane and government’s troops. MINUSMA was created.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was seen as incapable to put together a fully equipped military operation mission that could stabilize Mali. The United Nations deployed the MINUSA as a stabilization mission to support the Malian government in the fight against terrorist groups, extremists, separatists, and all armed groups [14]. The mission was to reduce the threat posed by these groups, as well as to stabilize the key invaded areas especially the Northern parts of the country. This became the turning point in the history of peacekeeping missions where traditional peacekeeping ordinances could not work at all. MINUSMA was engaged fully on a battlefield and many attacks of armed terrorists using different tactics killed many peacekeepers using suicide bombing, mortars, rockets, and improvised explosive devices.

Central to our study, the nature of this Malian intervention remained a top of discussion because, Duursma posed this enigma, whether the so-called peacekeeping mission was doing what a peacekeeping operation does or it was just an open war in its true meaning because the fighters now targeted no more its original enemy, but now the one fighting them. Not only that, it became a global security issue as the contributors of troops became targets of attacks even outside Mali, making a new twist to the whole business of war on terrorism.

According to many analysts, MINUSMA’s operations are said to be a peacekeeping mission but have nothing in common with other UN-mandated peacekeeping operations in other parts of the world, though we may have some similarities with AMISOM in Somalia. In addition to its original mission (It combined both its original mission and added new features which this study is aimed at birthing for the sake of the sustainability of UNmandated military operation missions [15]. Tull saw this, as a turning point in the whole UN security arrangement to put out a new body whose tasks will be specifically tailored towards fighting a well-organized world terrorist group.

This deviation in UN peacekeeping operations patterns will necessarily have to inform new orientations of this task of freeing the entire world of terrorism, which, unlike other missions that have a timeframe of operations, but this one remains a stand-by force the entire world would have to support and equip.

Other military operations in Mali and the region: Barkhane and G5-Sahel

G-5 Sahel (made of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad) forces was supported by international organizations such as AU and UN Security Councils in April 2017 to supplement the already existing UN mission on the ground. These G5 Sahel troops were later backed up by the MINUSMA and Barkhane troops from France lending a helpful hand with a complete combat float to stabilize the whole Sahel region [16]. All these forces converged on one mission, to counter-terrorism and other organized crime making fragile the security of the whole region.

When the joint force du G5 S) was formed and authorized to operate in 2017, it was proven to be more effective in its efforts to dismantle all terrorist networks due to the better knowledge of the environment they fight in.

AMISOM-Somalia: The East African region and the horn of Africa have been hardly hit by unending conflicts for so long. like in West Africa, Islamist terrorists backed up by Al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups have been destabilizing Somalia and its neighbors for many decades. Al-Shabaab (Barkat Al-Shabaab Al-mujahideen)’s origin can be traced to the clandestine Somali Islamist group Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya (AIAI), meaning Islamic unity. AIAI was formed in 1983 by Somalis who studied in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and ideologically subscribed to the paradigm of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Their ambition was to create a bigger Somali state comprising Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti [17]. Somalia has therefore been a theatre of endless conflicts and the magnitude of this insecurity treat has compelled the UN, Africa Union, USA, and other security agencies to deploy peacekeeping missions to halt the bloodshed and minimize fatalities as the Somali government, quite inexistent for long time, leaving a vacuum for so long. Africom accounts how the newly created transitional government lacked legitimacy and strength to assume its security obligations, its fragility and internal division among the same government made combating Al-Shabaab difficult. At the same time, terrorism and insurgent groups, especially Al-Shabaab but also ISIS-Somalia (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in more recent years had proved to be persistent and determined in their endeavors to undermine any process towards the consolidation of governmental institutions.

Like any other peacekeeping mission, AMISOM was mandated and deployed as a stabilization operation making humanitarian aid possible while protecting the transitional authorities and key state infrastructures in Mogadishu the Somali capital. Like in Mali, this initial mission saw a shift in the initial plan and had to rather lead very offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition armed groups’. Wondermagegnehu and Kbede argued that this atypical peacekeeping mission had no option other than fighting and engaging in war on terrorism which went well beyond the levels of force and tempo of operations generally expected in UN-led peacekeeping missions. AMISOM went out of its scope and in addition to its core mandate, it worked to engage in reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia, work towards an electoral process in the country that would lead to a central democratic government, train and equip local police to assume their duty to protect the citizens and their livelihood. In addition, they were to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the population in need while fostering enabling conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction, and development.

This mandate was encapsulated in the United Nations Security Council in its resolution 1744 of February 2007.

AMISOM’s achievement and failure as a peacekeeping mission

AMISOM was able to guarantee security to federal institutions and other institutions (local and International helping the government) and was able to drive away Al-Shaabab from Mogadishu and liberated major areas that were under the control of the enemy [18]. The mission was able to expand the humanitarian aid and provided relief services to a greater number of Somalis. The AMISOM expanded the territorial coverage the government could operate on. AMISOM has also built the capacities and skills of the local Somali police force by way of training, mentoring, advising, and initiating Quick Impact Projects (QIP). Far from being defeated, Al-Shabaab militants live together with the local population who at times see them as part of them. In some areas, Al-Shabaab has proven agile and resilient, in some places, the group provides basic services, notably quick and reliable, if often brutal, dispute resolution. This makes intelligence gathering difficult due to citizen complicity. These militant have infiltrated urban cites disguised and unidentifiable, making combating them very hectic. Also, due to the low number of troops the ground, the liberated areas are left alone and disconnected with no permanent army presence and can fall again into the hands of the same enemy at later times [19,20].

AMISON has logistical challenges and funding issues that make Al-Shabaab gain forces again. They are dealing with an armed group that keeps regenerating and metamorphosing. Within the fighters, they have a permanent continuity plan that makes them survive time and all odds. The little relaxation of the AU troops can overturn the hard-earned victory and can crumble the government the more.

MONUSCO-RDC CONGO: Undoubtedly, MONUSCO has provided valuable assistance to alleviate human suffering. As mentioned, MONUSCO’s military action against the CNDP prevented further violence in the DRC’s eastern provinces and the formation of the transitional government in 2003 eventually led to elections in 2006. However, many more attempts to focus on other areas of conflict, such a fighting over resource extraction, the use of rape as a weapon, and corruption rarely resulted in success. Even the transitional government, seen to mark the post-conflict period only resulted in more in-fighting based on ethnic rights and local insecurity. Yet, MONUSCO’s mandate did not adapt. Instead, it further imposed Westernized conceptions of state-building despite extensive evidence of their limitations and ineffectiveness, proving that the UN failed to draw lessons from its efforts to deal with complex conflicts, continuously relying on existing, rigid, frames.

MONUSCO’s entrance into the country was out of an outcry of unceasing brutality, and serious human rights violations caused by many rebel groups operating from Eastern parts of the country. Ndangam showed how the original mandate of this operation quickly shifted to military enforcement of security to reaffirm the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. From the onset, the UNSC (2000) gave MOMUSCO a great military push to enable them to control strategic points. In subsequent years, the UNSC has been resolving to strengthen the power of this mission as wars and all sorts of violence became the order of the day to the point of increasingly overwhelming MONUSCO which eventually saw its consent declining and losing its credibility from both the authority and the mass they were to protect.

Political analysts and researchers converged on the notion that the nature of insecurity the mission was tackling, was so complex and deep that much was to be done by a strong political will of both the state and international community to take a fair stand.

Discussion

Shortfalls of counterterrorism and stabilization missions

Over-reliance on military operations as means to enforce peace has self-destruction genes in itself: Civil wars and war on terrorism are two different scenarios and we can’t use the same model to deal with the two. In a civil war, people are from the same countries and is mostly due to frustrations, injustice, and unfair treatment of a portion of the population who finally end hostility through mediation, reconciliation, power-sharing deals and inclusion programs, social empowerment, and alike.

War on terrorism, on the other hand, does not deal with root causes, they only put water on the fire but fail to dig deep to see what causes that fire. They are an internationally backed-up network whose activities can be transnational.

In the current UN, AU, EU, FRANCE, and US counterterrorism strategies, there is the predominance of international military-security strategies and a weak or total absence of wider peace strategies. Groenewald’s studied that, short-term security gains hide the conflicts and only quench the burning intensity but it soon surfaces again, more violent and revitalized and well prepared to bounce back. At this time, foreign military interventions might have left the country.

Notwithstanding, the Taliban case can inform all the security agencies of the world powers, that sooner or later, the same problem comes back (special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction). The same mistakes are being done in Somalia where, the one priority agreed on by international actors has been “the job of degrading and defeating Al-Shabaab leaving behind the real drivers of the Somali conflict, which is undermining the development of a more comprehensive peace-building strategy.

For special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, over-reliance on military methods without a wider peace strategy can be more damaging simply because the case of Somalia Al- Shabaab is a symptom rather than a cause of fragility. UN and AU will be blamed by future generations for creating rather a worse future for the country because has largely failed to promote the actual long-term security needs of the Somali people. Al-Shabaab may seem to have been driven away, but as we ignore where it draws its forces and support, it will reemerge more invigorated when AMISOM is no more and as there is nothing to fill the void. Nadwa al-Dawsari made reference to the Yemeni case where similar mistakes were made by Western countries engaged in counter-terror and stabilization initiatives, including drone strikes, arms transfers, military and stabilization assistance, intelligence collaboration, and backing for offensives by the Yemeni government. However, both Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), its domestic wing Ansar Al-Sharia (AAS), and other militant groups still grew in strength. The narrow-minded focus on eliminating these groups blinded international actors to more urgent peace-building priorities, leading them to reinforce a predatory government and feed, rather than help avert, the crisis of 2011, the failure of Yemen’s transition, and the descent into civil war. This is what may happen to Somalia, Congo, Mali, and many countries where peacekeeping missions are rather taking the wrong direction. The attempt to establish a monopoly on state use of force “without negotiation or consensus” has largely disregarded the concerns of many Somalis, who as Jeremy Brickhill has pointed out, have good reason to be “both skeptical and fearful of the state”.

Failure of MONUSCO

Initially, while MONUSCO was initially authorized to back the FARDC, one of the only legitimate armed forces in Western statehood terms, FARDC soldiers substantially contributed to offenses against civilians, forcing the UN to backtrack cooperation. This demonstrated a fundamental lack of interest in thoroughly understanding local actors’ motivations and actions, as by taking sides MONUSCO compromised its ability to protect civilians and impartiality, and delegitimized other groups. The “lack of interest” is attributable to both the perceived complexity of the conflict and the rigidity of existing frames, as for the last 10 years UNSC resolutions focused solely on extending, not necessarily improving MONUSCO’s mandate or developing an exit strategy. Despite Joseph Kabila’s (Laurent Kabila’s son who took over power after his father was assassinated in 2001) demands withdrawal in 2006 and 2009, the UN continued to deploy MONUSCO “becoming a party to the conflict” as an enemy of the state. Consequently, MONUSCO continued to fail its mandate to protect civilians and restore institutions, rather furthering the DRC’s conflict.

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, MONUSCO has provided valuable assistance to alleviate human suffering. As mentioned, MONUSCO’s military action against the CNDP prevented further violence in the DRC’s eastern provinces and the formation of the transitional government in 2003 eventually led to elections in 2006. However, many more attempts to focus on other areas of conflict, such as fighting over resource extraction, the use of rape as a weapon, and corruption rarely resulted in success. Even the transitional government, seen to mark the post-conflict period only resulted in more in-fighting based on ethnic rights and local insecurity. Yet, MONUSCO’s mandate did not adapt. Instead, it further imposed Westernized conceptions of statebuilding despite extensive evidence of their limitations and ineffectiveness, proving that the UN failed to draw lessons from its efforts to deal with complex conflicts, continuously relying on existing, rigid, frames.

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